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CORPORATIONS AND EXPRESS TRUSTS 
AS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS.* 
ps, 
I 
Advantages Claimed. 
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RESIDE NT BUTLER of Columbia University is reported  to  
have  said  in  an  address  before  the  New  York  Chamber of 
, Commerce in 1911, that "the limited  liability corporation is the 
r greatest  single  discovery  of  modern  times,  whether  you  judge  it by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1913, 
its social, by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long  run­ after 
we understand it and know how to use it,­by its political, effects."1 
­ In 1912, in a paper submitted to the Tax Commissioner of Massa­ 
clmsetts, Alfred D. CHANDLER, of the Boston Bar, said "Express 
Trusts, whether created under wills, deeds of settlement, assign­ 
is ments Jor   the  benefit  of  creditors,  receiverships,  or  by  special dec­ 
. 
larations  of   trust,  to  manage  property  or  carry  on  business, are 
d 
neither corporations nor joint stock companies,  nor  partnerships, but 
they employ a distinct and the highest known method of admin­ 
istration."3 
The latest Statistical Abstract shows that in 1913,  there were in the 
United States 305,336 corporations,  with  over $96,000,000,000 of 
stock and bonds, with an income of over $3,8oo,ooo,ooo, and pay­ ing 
a tax to the Federal  government  of  over  $35,000,000.  The stock and 
bonds together represent nearly  or  quite  two thirds  of the wealth of 
the whole country. In 4 years, 1909­1913, the number of corporations 
increased over 40,000, and the stock and bonds over 
$ 12 ,000 ,000 ,000 .8 
• Address before the North Dakota State Bar Association, Sept. 17, 1914. 
1 The Government and the Corporations, by Francia Lynde Stetson, 110 Atl. M., 
p. 27, 32 (July, 19u) quoting from Pres. Butler. 
1 Express Trusts  under  the  Common  Law,  by  Alfred  Chandler,  p. 26.  Little, 
Brown & Co. 1912. 
• United States Statistical Abstract, 1913, p. 6oo. 
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In conservative Massachusetts in the five years, 1907­ r9r r, about 
lved 
6,500 corporations were created ; and during the same period over 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ordi nar y  4,000  were dissolved .by the legislature. In 1911, it was reported 
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that 4,000 California corporations would be dissolved for failure to 
pay a license tax, and 4,000 more in Missouri for failure to file the 
annual anti­trust statement. This shows an extraordinary mortality 
among corporations in these states.• 
In 1912, Express Real Estate Trusts in Boston alone owned 
$250,000,000 of property and there had been no deaths among 17 of them 
in 14 years. 5 
In 1905, President SrMMOKS of the  Fourth  National  Bank  in New 
York, and of the New York Stock Exchange, said : "The exten­ sion of 
the principle of incorporation has enabled  leaders in  business to set up 
two standards of morality, to maintain a Jekyll and Hyde duality, and to 
do as members of an impersonal and non­moral cor­ porate body acts 
which they would shrink from as individuals. In private  life  they  are  
stainless,  but  in  the  interests  of  corporations, 
* * * they   will   have  recourse   to  every   villainy   damned   in  the 
n decalogue."0 And in 1910, President \VILSON, in his address be­ 
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fore the American Bar Association pleaded "earnestly for the indi­ 
vidualization of responsibility within the corporation, for the estab­ 
lishment of the principle  of  law  that  a  man  has  no  more  right  to do 
wrong as a member of a corporation than as an inclividua l.'' 7 
On the other hand to quote !vIAITLA::­.'D, "It is  said­and  appeal  is made 
to long experience,­that men are  more  conscientious  w_hen they are 
doing acts in their own names than when they are using the 
, name of a corporation." 8 "A very high degree not only of honesty, 
but of diligence has been required of t rustees."9 "No higher stand­ 
ards of administrative conduct are evoked by Courts than those which 
trusts require."1 0 
 
 
 
 
s, 
Special Advantages of Corporations. 
The advantages of incorporation have long been 
frequently referred to in the literature of our law. 
hundred years ago, BR1\C1'0N said: "If an abbot, 
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More than six 
or prior * * * 
 
 
• Chandler, Express Trusts, p. 10, and Supplement. 
1  Report  of  Tax   Commissioner   (Wm.  D.  T.  Trefry),  Mass.  1912,  p.  18. Chandler, 
Express Trusts, p. II. 
0 As quoted by Chandler, Express Trusts, p. .:zo, from the New York Daily Tribune, 
Oct. 7, 1905. 
7 The Lawyer and the Community, Am. Bar Assn. Rep., 1910, pp. ·419, 438. 
8 Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 362. 
1 lb., p. 35.:z. ­ 
•• Chandler Express Trusts, p. 24. 
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claim land in the name of their church upon the seisin of their pre­ 
decessors  *  * * the declaration  should  not  be frorn abbot to abbot, 
y or  prior  to  prior,  nor should  there  be mention  of  the intermediate 
abbots  or  priors,  because  in colleges and  in chapters  the same cor­ 
r,  poration always remains, although they all die successively  and others 
are substituted in their place, as may be said of  flocks  of sheep, where 
there is always  the  same  flock,  although  all  the  sheep or heads 
successively depart, nor does any individual of them succeed to another 
by right of succession in such manner that  the right   desce ds   by  
inheritance   from  one  to   another,   because the 
right  always  pertains  to  the church,  and  remains  with  the church. 
, * *  * And  accordingly  if   the  abbot  or   the  prior,  the  monks  or 
canons successively die,  the  house  remains  to  etem ity."11 
BLACKSTONE writing five centuries later than BRACTON, and at the 
very beginning of the application of science and invention to indus­ 
trial conditions, in anything like modem ways, says in summing up 
the corporation law of his time:­ 
''To show the advantages of these incorporations, let  us consider the 
case of a college in either of our universities, founded ad stu­ dendum 
et orandum, for the encouragement  and  support  of  relig­ ion and 
learning. If this were a mere voluntary assembly, the individuals which 
compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and perform scholastic 
exercises  together,  so long as  they  could  agree to do so; but they  
neither  frame,  nor  receive any laws  or  rules  of of their conduct ; 
none at least which would have any binding force, for  want of  coercive 
power  to create a sufficient obligation.  Keither 
r, could  they  be  capable  of  retaining  any  privileges  or  immunities ; 
 
 
 
 
ted  for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ls; 
assembly has the right,  or  ability,  to  defend  them?  And,  when they 
are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they  transfer these 
advantages to another set of students, equally unconnected 
, as themselves? So, also, with regard to holding estates or other 
property, if land be granted for the purposes  of  religion or  learning to 
twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no leg;al way of con­ 
tinuing the property to any  other  persons  for  the  same  purposes, but 
by endless conveyances from one to the other, as often as the hands are 
changed.  But  when they are consolidated  and united  into a 
corporation, they and their successors are then considered as one person 
in law; as one person, they have one will, which is collected from the 
sense of the majority of the individuals; this one will may establish rules 
and orders for the regulations of the whole, which 
11  Bracton, Treatise on  Laws of  England,  (c.  1264),  Vol.  5, Twiss's  Ed.,  pp. 447­449. 
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are a sort of municipal laws of this little  republic;  or  rules  and statutes 
may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are then in the place of 
natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the estates and possessions, 
of the corporation, when once vested in them, will be forever vested, 
without any new conveyance to new  successions;  for all the individual 
members that have existed­ from the foundation  to the present time, or 
that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person 
y:  in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames 
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is still the same river, though the parts which  compose it are  chang­ ing 
every instan t." 1 2 
In  1819 Chief  Justice  MARSHAL!,  put  it  this  way:  "A  corporation is 
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, _and existing Qnly in con­ 
templation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation con£ers  upon  it, either 
expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
out  such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which 
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it  was  created.  Among  the  most  important   are   immortality,  and, if 
the expression may  be allowed,  individuality: properties  by  which a 
perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
es si on and  may  act  as  a single, individual. They enable a corporation to 
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manage its own affairs and to hold property without the perplexing 
intricacies, the hazardous and enpless necessity of perpetual convey­ 
ances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly 
for the purpose of clothing the bodies of men in succession with those 
qualities and capacities that corporations were invented and are in use. 
By these means a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of 
acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal  
heing."  1,: 
Special Advantages of Express Trusts. 
Upon the other hand the special  advantages  of  Express  Trusts  have 
recently been stated as follows :a 
(I) These associations have been found by the experience of twenty­
five years to be a convenient, safe and  unobjectionable meth­ od of 
cooperative ownership and management. 
( 2) The form of organization  ensures  a  continuity  of  manage­ ment 
and control which appeals strongly to investors in real estate. which 
cannot be secured by  a  corporation  with  changing  officers. The trustees 
who are the managing officers of  a  trust  are  not  so likely to be changed 
as are the directors of a corporation. 
 
 
12 Blackstone, Commentaries, (1765), Ch. 18, Of Corporations. 
u Trustees of Dartmouth College v; Woodward, (1819), 4 Wheat. (17  U. S.) 518. 
"Report of Tax Commissioner of Mass., 1912, p. 21. 
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(3) It affords a more economical and more convenient and flex­ 
e  ible  form of  management  than  does a corporation. Trustees can 
transact business with more ease and rapidity than directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
ffm ent , "In the early development of uses a device was struck upon that 
s gave permanence as well as relief from the various feudal burdens. 
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This  was  the  joint  tenancy. An owner will convey his land to a 
party of friends, to hold as joint tenants. "There will then be no 
h 
inheritance,  and  no relief, wardship, marriage. By keeping up the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l n’s  wall of joint tenants, by feoffment and refeoffment, he can keep 
l; out the lord and can reduce the chances of reliefs and so forth to 
nothing.''  15      There is  here  no inheritance,  only  accrescence1.6 
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bodies" that have lived behind the trustee wall for long periods of 
years." He says "Imagine a foreign tourist, with Baedeker in hand 
visiting one of our 'Inns of Court,' let  us  say  Lincoln's  Inn.  He sees 
the chapel and the ,library  and  the dining hall ; he sees the  ex­ 
ternal gates that are shut  at  night.  * * * On  inquiring  he  hears  of an 
ancient  constitution  that  had  taken  shape before 1422.   * *  * You 
have  here a Privateverein  which  has not even  juristic  personality. 
* * * Its members might divide the property that is held  for  them by  
trustees.  *  * The English  judges  who  received  and  repeated a 
great deal of the canonistic learning about corporations * * * were to a man members of these * * * 
and had never found that 
the want of juristic personality was a serious misfortune.17 
ed  Then there are (or were until 6 weeks ago) the ships of Com­ merce 
carrying the name of Lloyds into all the seas of the world ; almost 
from the beginning there was among these insurers of the world's 
commerce only a very loose organization with the exclusive 
i ng 
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use of a coffee house, and a .small  trust  fund, until  the trust  deed of 
1811 was executed  with  over  1,100  signatures,  and  until  1871  "it 
was an unincorporated V erein, without the least  trace  (at least so we 
said)  of  juristic  personality  about  it."  It  was incorporated in 1871, 
because in that year there was recovered from the Zuyder­ Zee, a large 
mass of treasure that had been lying there since 1799, and, because of 
the destruction of records by fire, it belonged to no one could say 
whom.18 
There is also the London Stock Exchange, beginning in 1773 when 
the name was "wrote over the door" at New Johnathan's Coffee 
House. "In 1802 a costly site was bought, a costly building erected, 
 
 
"Maitland, Lectures on Equity, p. 26. 
10 Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 336. 
17 Maitland,  Trust  &  Corporation,  Collected  Papers,  Vol.  III,  p.  369­371. 
" lb. pp. 371­3:73. 
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and an elaborate constitution was formulated in "a deed of settle­ 
ment.'' There was a capital of £20,000 divided into 400 shares. Be­ hind 
the trustees stood a body of "proprietors," who had found the money 
; and behind the "proprietors" stood a much larger body of 
"members" whose subscriptions formed the income that was divided 
 
 
ed,” among the "proprietors." "In 1876 there was a new deed of settle­ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ym en, 
ment; in 1882 large changes were made in it: there was a capital of 
£240,000 divided  into  20,000  shares.  * * *  The  organization  is  of a 
high type. * * * In 1877 a Royal Commission  * *  * recommend­ 
ed that the Stock Exchange should  be  incorporated,"  and  the  bye laws 
be made sn!:>ject to the approval of the Board of Trade. "That; was the 
Cloven hoof. Ex pede diabolum."  It  was not  incorporated, yet 
MAITLAND says; "it would  not, I think, be easy to find anything  that  a  
corporation   could   do  that  is  not  being  done  by  this  nicht 
rechtsf iilzige V erein"  ( society without legal capacity) .1 0 The New 
York Stock Exchange also is unincorporated. 
MAITLAND, with his delightful humor,  says  again:  "I  believe  that in 
the eyes of a large number of my fellow countrymen, the most important 
and august tribunal in England is not the House of 
Lords  but  the  Jockey  Club.  * * * Some  gentlemen   form  a  club, 
buy  a   race  course,  the  famous   Newmarket  Heath,  which  is  con­ 
veyed to trustees for them, and then  they  can  say  who  shall  and who 
shall not be admitted to it. I fancy, however,  that  some  men  who  have  
been  excluded  from  this sacred  heath  ("warned  off New 
mists ,” 
.Market Heath" is our  phrase),  would  have  much  preferred  the 
major excommunication of that "historic organism" the Church of 
g Rome." 20 
n This  reference  to  the  Church   justifies  further  quotation from 
MAITLAND. He says "All that we English people mean by "religious 
liberty"  has  been  intimately  connected   with  the  making  of  trusts. 
t * * * 
nd If  in 1688  the choice  had  lain  between  conceding  no tolera­ 
s  tion at all and forming corporations of Nonconformists," they  would 
have been "Untolerated for a long time to come, for in Eng­ land, as 
elsewhere, incorporation meant privilege and exceptional favour. 
And, on the other­ hand, there were among the Noncon­ formists 
many who would have thought that even toleration was dearly  
purchased if  their  religious affairs  were  subjected  to State 
control. * * * If  the  State  could  be  persuaded  * * * to  repeal  a  few 
persecuting laws * * * Trust would do the  rest  * * *.  Trust  soon  did  
the  rest.  * * * And  now  we  have  in  England  Jewish  Syn­ 
agogues  and  Catholic  cathedrals  and  the  churches  and  chapels  of 
" Ib. pp. 373­376. 
""Ib. p. 376. 
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countless  sects. They   are   owned   by natural  persons. They are 
owned by trustees." 21 
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In this way were the lands of the Methodist churches and chapels 
held throughout England and the United States, under model deeds 
used by John Wesley in the very beginninJ; of his ministry to the effect 
that the trustees, for the time being should permit Wesley himself, and 
such other persons as he might, from time to time ap­ point, to have 
the free use of such premises, to preach therein God's holy word, and 
after his death "for the sole use of such persons as might be appointed 
by the yearly conference ;"22 these deeds were confirmed and made 
perpetual under his deed of trust of 1784, es­ tablishing the :Methodist 
General Conference of 100, and which has been called the Magna 
Charta of that church.23 
And although our Supreme Court has recently held, following  the 
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that the Roman Cath­ olic 
Church is a corporation "which antedates by almost a thousand years 
any other  personality  in Europe," 24   yet  the great  "organized 
operative institution" known as the Established Church of England, 
tracing its existence  back  to  Theodore of  Tarsus, 669 A.   D. "is  not 
 
 
 
 
 
ons. a corporate body." • 
It would seem from these illustrations, that other institutions 
known to the law based upon trusteeships rival in duration and per­ 
 
ci ati on  
manence the immortality of corporations. 
It  is  my  purpose  to  compare  these  two,­Corporations  and Ex­ 
,  press Trusts,­in such detail as my time will permit, to discover, 
if perchance we may, something of the strength and weakness of 
each, 
n for business purposes, under present day conditions. 
Theory of Corporate E xistence.26 
A recent definition by Chief Justice BALDWIN of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, says a corporation is "an association of persons to whom 
the sovereign has offered a franchise to become an artificial, 
21 lb. pp. 363­364. 
22 Life and Times of John Wesley. by L. Tyerman, Vol. 3, p. 419; Lost Chapters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
orati ons  
from Early History of American  Methodism, by J. B. Wakeley, p. 58, where a copy of 
the deed  for a  Methodist  Preaching­house, on John Street, N. Y., dated  Nov.  2, 1770, 
is given. 
23 Tyerman, p. 421. 
"Barlin ,.. Ramirez (1906), 7 Phil. 41; Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church (1908), 
210 U. S. 296; Santos v. Roman Catholic Church  (1909), 212 U. S. 463. 
,. 3 Encyc. of Laws of England, p. 14; 2 Stephen's Commentaries, 16th Ed. (1914), 
p. 806; 1i" Halsbury's The  Laws  of  England,  p.  371,  Sec.  706  (Ecclesiastical  Law).  
"' Bibliography: 
Angell and Amee, Law of Private Corporations, Introduction and Ch. I. (1st Ed. 
183r, and subsequent editions.) 
Baldwin, S. ,E., History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and 
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o-Am. Brissaud, J., History of French Private Law, Continental Legal History Series, 
( 1912), pp. 889­905. 
7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ani es , 
Brown, W. Jethro, The Austioian Theory of Law, (1906), pp. 254­270; The Per• 
sonality of the Corporation and the State, 21 Law Quart. Rev. 365. 
Carr,  Cecil  Thomas,  Early  Forms  of  Corporateness.  Ch.  IX,  in  General   Principles of 
the Law of Corporations, 3  Select  Essays,  Anglo­Am.  Legal  Hist.  (1905),  p.  161;  Select 
Charters of Trading Companies, 1530­1707. Selden Society, Vol. 28 (1913). 
Cawston and Keane, The Early Chartered Companies, 1296­1858, (1896). 
w 
Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations, Vol. I, Ch. I. 
Davis,  John  P.,  Corporations,  A  Study  of  Origin  and  Development,  (1905);  Nature 
of Corporations, 12 Polit. Science Quar. 273. 
Deiser, George F., The Juristic Person, 57 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) 131, (1908). 
Elliot, C. B., Private Corporations, Ch. I, (1897). 
it y  
Evans, F.,  The  Evolution  of  the  English  Joint  Stock  Trading  Company,  8  Colum­ 
bia L. R. 339, 461 (1908); What is a company? 26 Law Quart. Rev. 259­263. 
Freund, E.,  Legal  Nature  of  Corporations,  University  of  Chicago  Studies  in  Polit· 
ical Science. 
Geldart, W. M., Legal Personality, 27 Law Quart. Rev., 90 ­(1910). 
Gierke, 0., Political Theories of Middle  Ages,  tr.  by  F.  W.  M.aitland  (1913), In­ 
troduction pp. viii­xliii, 67­73, with notes. 
Holdsworth, W. S., History of English Law, Vol. 3, pp. 362­376. 
Johnson, A. B., Legislative History of Corporations in New  York,  20  Hunt's  Mer­ 
chant's Magazine, 610 (1850). 
Kent, James, Commentaries, (1827), Vol. II, Leet. 33. 
Kyd, S., Corporations (1793), Introduction. 
v .  Machen, A. W. Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. Law Rev., (19n), pp. 253, 347. 
Maitland, F. W,, The Crown as Corporation, 3 Coll. Pap. pp. 244­270; The Unin­ 
corporated Body, lb., pp. 271­284; The Body Politic, lb., pp.  285­303; Moral  Person­ ality 
and Legal Personality, lb., pp. 304­320; Trust and Corporation, lb., pp. 321­404. 
t 
See also 14 Journal Comp. Leg., p. 192. 
Manson E., Evolution of the Private  Company,  26  Law  Quart.  Rev.,  pp.  11­16. 
Merritt, W. W., Some Views of the Nature and Effect of Corporateness, 10 Mich. 
Law Rev., p. 310 (1912). 
Miraglia, Luigi, Comparative Legal Philosophy, (Vol. III,  Modern  Legal  Philos• 
ophy Series, tr. by John Lisle, 1912), Ch. III, Incorporeal Persons, pp. 361­381. 
Moore, J. H., Development of Corporation Law in this Country, Ark. Bar Assn. 
 
 
poreal  Rep. (1909),  pp. 45­81. 
Morawetz, V., Private Corporations, Preface, 2d Ed. (1886). 
Pike, L. O., Introduction to Year Book, 16 Ed. III, part I, p.xlvi. 
Pollock, Sir F., Contracts, 6th Ed., 108; 7th Ed., 113; Has the Common Law  Re­ 
ceived the Fiction Theory of Corporations? 27 Law Quart. Rev. ;119 (19n). 
Pollock and Maitland, History of English  Law,  pp.  469­51I,  660­688. 
Radin, Max, Legislation of Greeks & Romans on Corporations (1909). 
Rashdall, H., The Universities  and  the  Legislature,  29  Law  Quart.  Rev.,  76­84 
(1913). 
Raymond, R. L., The Genesis of a Corporation, 19 Harv. Law Rev. 350 (1906). 
Salmond, J. W., Jurisprudence, Ch. XV, (3d Ed. 1910). 
, Scott, W. R., Constitution and Finance of English & Irish Joint Stock Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
epti on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
's  
to 1720, 3 Vols. (1910­1912). 
Seymour, E. B., History of the Common  Law Conception of a  Corporation,  42 .l\m. 
L. Reg. (N. S.), 1902, p. 529. 
Sheppard,  Wm.,  Corporations,  Fraternities,  and   Guilds   (1659). 
Smith, H. A., The Persons Ficta, 26 Jurid. Rev., pp. 59­74 (1914). 
Sohm, R., 'The Institutes of the Roman Law, Ledlie's trans., 2d Ed. (1901), Ch. II, 
pp. 195­214. 
State Trials, (King v. City of London), Vol. 8, pp. 1039­1358 (1682). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rm it y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rati on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.” 
juridical person, with a name of its own, under which  they can act and 
contract, and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer and 
effected an organization in substantial conformity with  its terms." 7 
There are three fundamental ideas here: A corporation is a new 
person in the law resulting from the acceptance of a franchise to 
become such, by an association of persons. 
The first of these,­that a corporation is a  person,28  separate from  its 
members, has already been referred ti'> as its chief characteristic and 
advantage. This idea  of  the personality  and  unity  of  a  group is not 
new but old, almost as old as language. We are  told  nowa­ days that 
the primitive mind of man had a more definite and positive idea of the 
unity and solidarity of the horde,  or  pack, or  clan  or tribe of savage 
hunters and warriors, than it had of the personality 
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rati ons , 
of its individual members. 29 
Among all  the  Aryan  peoples,­Hindu,  Greek,  Roman,  Teuton, or 
Slav,­the oldest artificial person seems to have  been  the  fam­ ily.30 
The Ancient Egyptians and Babylonians personified the Tem­ ple.31 
Long before JusTINIAN all the members of a corporation were considered 
one person or body in the Roman Law.32 
The canonists of the  13th  century  call  it  a  persona  ficta,  not  found 
in the world of sense, but created by law, invisible, immortal, 
s a body that has no body and no soul; it cannot sin, or be excom­ 
Sutton's Hospital Case, 10 Coke Rep,, pp. 1­35 (1613). 
Taylor, H. 0.,  Private  Corporations,  Prefaces,  and  Chs.  I­IV.  (1884  and  subsc· 
qucnt editions). 
rat e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rati on, 
Trapnell,  Benj.,  The  Logical  Conception  of  a  Corporation,  West  Virginia  Bar 
Assn. Report 1896, Appendix to Clark on Corporations, 1st Ed., p. 643. 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518. 
Wilgus, H. L., Corporation Cases, pp. 1­167 with notes (1900). 
\Villiston, Samuel, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 18oo, 2 
Harv, Law Rev., 105, 149 (1888), 3 Select Essays Anglo­Am. Legal Hist. p. 195. 
\Vormser, I. M., Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912), 12 Col. Law Rev. 
496, 
Wright, A. G., The California State Tax on Corporate Franchises, 1 Cal. Law Rev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hen,  
91, (1913), 
Young, E. H., Legal Personality of a Foreign Corporation, 22 Law Quart. Rev. 
178 (1906), Foreign Companies and Other  Corporations,  Cambridge  University  Press, 1912. 
(The foregoing 'bibliography includes only such works as contain important matter 
relating to corporate theory or history.) 
21 Mackay v, N, Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (1909), 82 Conn. 73, 81, 72 At!. 583. 
28 Sec  particularly  in  bibliography  given  in  note  26  above,  Blackstone,  Brissaud, Brown,  
Carr,  Deiser,  Freund,  Gcldart,  Gierke,  Machen,  Maitland,  Miraglia,   Pike,   Pol­ lock, Salmond, 
SeymouT, Sohm, Wilgus. 
18 Morawetz, I 1, p. 2. 
'° Hearn, The Aryan Household, pp. 64­6. 
n Johns, C. H. W., Babylonian & Assyrian Laws, Contracts  &   Letters,  Ch.  XX (1904); 
Simcox, E. J., Primitive Civilizations, Vol. I, pp. 171­179. 
12 Amos, Sheldon, History and Principles of Civil Law of Rome, p. 118. 
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municated, nor commit a crime, and probably not a tort.33  Early  in the 
14th century these words were being repeated in the year books  of 
English  law  by the  English  judges.  In  1311  it  was considered a 
body (im corps), existing per se, and not  appendant or  appurte­ nant 
to something else.34 And only a short time ago :\Ir. Justice McKENNA, of 
the United State Supreme Court said "Undoubtedly 
 
 
ons . a corporation is in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its 
stockholders and officers."35 It  is such,  for  the most  part, in  rela­ 
h 
tion  to outside parties; it  has  rights of  property  and  reputation, and 
, is  subject  to  general  duties  under  the  common   law  and statutes; 
and is also considered a person as to ownership of property,  and suing 
and being sued, and in considerable measure  it  is  so  under the 
protection of constitutional and treaty provisions. 36 
The second of these,­that a corporation results from the accept­ ance  
of  a  f ranchis e31     from  the  state,­although now  so frequently 
us  criticized  or belittled,  historically  has been as important  as the per­ 
n sonality  of the corporation. In  fact  in  legal  theory,  the privilege, 
the franchise itself, is the capacity of  separate personality,  conferred 
ns 
upon   the  group.    The  legal  ideas  involved   come   from   the Roman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ucti on. 
and from the Feudal law. From the Roman, the franchise is a priv­ ilege 
of a public nature conferred by the state for political or public reasons. 
Anciently perhaps in Greece  and  Rome  groups  of  per­ sons were 
associated without authority of the state, and acted much  as a single 
person; but the Romans were jealous of such and many laws were made 
against illicit companies between the Twelve Tables (450 B. C.) and 
the Empire; Caesar  and  Augustus  did  the  same; and in the time of 
Caius, and Marcian, corporations could be cre­  ated only under special 
or general legislative authority. 38 
The same Political theory of corporate existence prevailed in the 
y, 
middle ages. "The corporation is and must be the creature of the 
, 
state. Into its nostrils the state must breathe the breath of fictitious 
life, for  otherwise it  would be no animated  body  but Individualistic 
). dust." 39 In  the  Year  Books  of   our  law  in  1376,  it  was  ruled  that 
s, Pollock & lllaitland, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 477. Note 'Wilgus's Cases, pp. 72­79. 
•• Y. R., 4 Ed. II, 103; Y. B., 16 F,d. III; Pike's Introduction. 
80 1\lcCask ill  Co.  v.  U.S.  (1910),  216 U.S. 504,  514.    An,! Cave,  J., In  re  Sheffield 
etc. Society  (1889),  says "A  corporation  is a  legal  person  just  as  much  as  an  individual." 
L. R. 22 Q. Il. D. 470 on 476. 
""See Cases, \Vilgus, Corp. Cases, pp, 33­72. 
17  See  bibliography  in  note  26  above,  particularly,  Blackstone,   Gierke,   (Maitland's tr. 
Introduc., pp. xx."ti­xxxviii), Kent, State Trials, Trustees Dart. Coll. ,•. \Voodward (Washington's 
Opinion), Wilgus, (Corp. Cases, pp. 113­170), Wright. 
18  Kent,  Comm.,  Vol.  2, pp.  268­9;  Taylor's  El.  Civil  Law,  pp.  567­57r;  Digest, xlvii, 
22, 1 and 3 (Marcian); Digest, iii, 4, 1 (Caius). 
•• Maitland's Summary, in Gierke's Pol. Th. of Mid. Ages, p. :o.xx. 
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·'none but the king can make a corporation."40 And as we all know with 
us today "the right to form a private corporation can only be acquired 
from the state."n 
From the Feudal law this privilege was not merely a personal priv­ 
h 
ilege,  but  was  looked  upon  as  a  privilege  of   a   property  kind. The 
:.Iedieval  mind  had  a  peculiar  tendency  to look  upon  all  sorts of 
NE immaterial  or  incorporeal  things  and  privileges  as property;  as for 
example, the right of adrnwson. Feudal rights and incidents, too 
intangible to be called  holdings, were yet considered  property  in the 
:.Iedieval law."12 In    1691  it  \Vas  said "the  whole  frame and essence 
e of  the  corporation  consist"  of  the  franchises  which  are  "the liga­ 
ments of  this body  politic." 43  CoMYNS says in 1740, "A  corporation   is 
a franchise created by the king." BLACKSTONE and KENT say the same. 
Such a  view  is  not  dead  nor  sleepeth  yet.  It  was  the  real basis of Mr. 
Justice WASHINGTON's decision in the Dartmouth Col­ lcgc  case.u    In  
1887,  Mr.  Justice  BRADLEY  said:  "A  franchise  is a 
right  of   public  concern.  * * *  No  persons  can  make  themselves a 
body corporate an.cl politic without legislative authority. Corporate 
capacity  is  a  franchise."45        Ten  years  ago  the  Supreme  Court  of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ti al  California said "The right to be and exist as a corporation is a 
 
 
 
 
 
rat ed grant by the sovereign power, a valuable right" and subject to taxa­ 
tion.40 And  just  the other  day it  was said: "A corporate  franchise is 
the right to exist as an entity for the purpose of doing things per­ mitted 
by law." 47 And the exercise of such right is subject to taxa­ tion.48 
The third of these,­that a corporation is really an association or 
collection of individuals, is strongly insisted upon by Mr. 1forawetz 
and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Morawetz says: It is "essential to bear in mind 
 
 
 
 
cisc o  distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated association, 
are in reality, the rights and duties of the persons  who compose  it, 
not  of  an imaginary being."40 And Mr. Taylor: There are "two 
• 0 Y. B., 49 Ed. III, 17. 
n People v. Mackey (1912), 255 Ill. 144, 156, 99 N. E. 370. 
., McKcchnie, Magna Carta, pp. 383­4. 
"'King v. London, Carthew, 217; 1 Show. 275­6, 
.. 4 \Vheat. 518 on 657, (1819). 
•• California v, Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U. S. ,, 40. 
.. Bank of  California  v.  City  &  Co.  of  San  Francisco  (1904),  142  Cal.  276,  100Am. St.  
R.  130,  75  Pac.  832;  Crocker  v.  Scott,  149   Cal.  575,   87   Pac.  89;   Western   Union Oil Co. 
v. Los Angeles (19n), 161Cal. 204,  n8  Pac.  721;  Farr  Alpaca  Co.  v.  Commw. (1912),   212  
Mass.  156.     Compare  Detroit  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Common   Council   (1901), 125 
;\lich.  673,   84   Am.  St.   R.   589,   85   N.   W.   96;     Blackrock   Copper   Min.   Co.   v. Tingey 
( 1908),  34 Utah  369,  98  Pac. 180;  Cooper  v.  Utah  Light  &c. Co.  (1909),  35 Utah,  570, 
102 Pac. 202. See 1 Cal. Law Rev. 91 (1913). 
"State v. Business Men's Assn. ( 1914), ­ Mo. App., ­, 163 S. W. 901. 
•• People v. Sohmer ( 1914), 147 N. Y. S. 6II. 
•• Morawctz Private Corp. 2d Ed. Preface and U 227­231 ; Sec Note \Vilgus Cases, 
p. IIO, 
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meanings of the term corfX)ration; the one, the sum of legal rela­ tions 
subsisting in respect to the corporate enterprise; the other the organic 
body of shareholders, whose acts cause the operation of the rules of  
law  in  the  constitution.  These  two  conceptions  include all that is 
really connoted by the term in whatever sense used.  And,  if so, what 
has become of the venerable 'legal person'? Is he still somewhere, as 
he has aways been  imagined?  Or  is he nowhere as he has always 
actually been? Shall  we say  he is the combination,  the mystic 
unification of our two conceptions? Better not ; better forget him."Go 
T/1<eory  of   the  T ru.st.51 
Trusts of course are  the  creation  of  the  English  courts  of equity. 
As :\lAITLAND  says,  "Of  all  the  exploits  of  equity  the largest and 
most important is the invention and development of the 
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"'Taylor, Private Corp., Preface, §§ 48­51. See  Note \Vilgus  Cases, p. 1 I 1. 
• 1 Bibliography: 
­ Ames, J. B., The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 Harv. Law Rev., 261­274 (1908), 
2 Select Essays Anglo­Am. Legal Hist. 737­752,  Lectures  on  Legal  History,  pp.  233,  243. 
Cases on Trusts (1893). 
Chandler, A. D., Express Trusts under Common Law (1912). 
Cook, \V, W., Law of Private Corporations, 7th Ed., Vol. 2, § 622 (1913). 
Cook, Prof.  W.  W.,  The  Place of  Equity  in   Our   Legal   System,   Am.   Bar.   Ass'n 
Rcpt. 1912, pp. 997­1009, 3 Am. L.  S.  Rev. 173. 
Conyngton, Thomas, Corporate Organization, Ch. XLIII, pp. 362­374. 
Fletcher, Charles, Essay on Estates of Trustees (1835). 
Fonblanque, J., Treatise on Equity ( 1805), Book II, Chs. 1­8. 
nc e 
Gager, E. B., History of Equity in American Colonies and States, in two Centuries 
d of Growth of American Law, (Yale Univ. Studies, 1901 ). 
Gilbert, G., Law of Uses and Trusts, (3d Ed. 1811 Sugden). 
Hampson, Sir G.  F.,  Liabilities  of  Trustees,  and  Indemnity  allowed  them  by  Courts 
of Equity (1830). 
_ Hart, W. G., The place of trust in jurisprudence  (1912),  28 Law  Quart.  Rev. 290. 
Hill, James, Law Relating to Trustees (1846, and subsequent editions). 
Hogg, J. E., Legal Estate in English Property  Law  (1910),  22  Jurid.  Rev.  55­9. 
Hohfeld, W. N., Relation between Equity and Law (1913), 11 Mich. Law Rev. 
537 ct seq. 
Holmes, 0. W. Jr., Early English Equity, I Law Quart. Rev. (1885), pp. 162­174, 
2 Select Essays Anglo­Am. Leg. Hist. 705. 
Jenks, Edward, The Legal Estate, 24 Law Quart. Rev. (1908), pp. 147­156. 
Kerley,  D.  M.,  Historical  Sketch  of  Equity  Jurisdiction  of  Court  of  Chancery 
(18go). 
Kenneson, T. D., Cases on Trusts (19n). 
Lewin, Thomas, Law of Trusts and Trustees (1839,  and  subsequent  editions). 
Loring, A. P., Trustees Handbook (3d Ed. 1907). 
­  Maitland,  F.  W.,  Equity  (1910­13);  Trust  and  Corporation,  3  Coll.  Papers, 321­404. 
e, Newbold,   D.   M.,   Notes  on   Introduction  of   Equity   Juris.  in  Maryland  1634­1720 
 
 
 
 
ees , (1906). 
Page, T. N., Disappearance of fiduciary principle, 16 Am. Law Rev. 247, 302 (1908). Perry, 
J,  W.,  Treatise  on  Law  of  Trusts  and  Trustees,  (1872  and  later  editions). Pike, L. 0., 
Common Law and Conscience, 1 Law Quart. Rev. (1885), 443­454; 
:, Select Essays Anglo­Am,  Leg. Hist., 722, 
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. I, p. 520; Vol. II, pp. 228­239. 
, 
Robinson, C., History of High Court of Chancery, Vol. I (1882). 
Sanders, F. W., Essay on Uses and Trusts (1791, and later editions). 
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Trust. It is an institute of great elasticity and generality; as elastic, 
as general as contract." 62 
Our   trust   is  refined   from   the  doctrine  of   uses  as   they were 
g established   in  our  law   before  the  Statute  of Uses. 63 The  older 
writers  traced  uses  to  the   Roman   fidei­commissa,   introduced   in the 
Roman law, 170 years B. C. to evade the laws prohibiting the appointing of 
a daughter,  stranger  or'  an  exile  as  an  heir.  The  testator devised his 
property to a qualified citizen  as  his  heir,  uni­ versal devisee, or executor, 
with a request, by precatory words, depending  only  on  the  good   faith   
or  honor,  strong  in   the   Roman 
, breast,  of  such  heir  to  restore  or  hand  over  the  inheritance,  or a 
part  of  it, to the  designated  person.   To  secure  the enforcement of 
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the request the testator implored or appealed to the Emperor, to 
AucusTus, who flattered by such appeal, on the advice of a com­ 
mittee of jurisconsults, made these requests obligatory, under the 
direction of the  Consuls;  and  later  under  MARCUS  AURELIUS,  a praetor 
was appointed to enforce them, acting extra ordin em.34 
Later writers, such as POLLOCK and MAITLAND, doubt the  direct descent 
of our doctrine of uses and trust from this Roman  origi­  nal,55 mainly 
becaUje different terms were used in our early law. They say, however,  
that "The Frank  of  the Lex  Salica,  (475 A. D.) 
 
 
Scrutton,  T.  S.,   Roman   Law   Influence  in   Chancery,   1  Select   Essays  Anglo­Am. 
Legal Hist., p. 208 ct seq. 
, Sears, J. H., Trust Estates as Business Companies (1912). 
Spence, George, Equitable Jurisdiction of  the Court of  Chancery (1846). 
. Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts, Report on  Voluntary  Ass'ns  (1912); also Re­ port 
of Special Commission to investigate voluntary associations in Massachusetts (1913). (No. 
1788 House.) 
Underhill, A., Law Relating to Private Trusts and Trustees (1896). 
Veeder, V. V., A Century of English Judicature, 1 Select Essays Anglo­Am. Leg. 
Hist., p. 730, 13 Green Bag, 23 ct seq. 
Whitlock, A. N., Classification of the Law of Trusts, 1 Cal. Law Rev. 215 (1913). 
Willoughby,   R.  M.  P.,   The   Legal  Estate  (1912),  Cambridge Univ.  Press. · 
Willis, J. W., Duties and Responsibilities of Trustees (1827). 
Wilson, S.  D.,  Courts  of  Chancery  in  the  American  Colonies,  28 Am.   Law   Rev. 
(1884), pp. 226­255,  2 Select  Essays Anglo­Am.  Leg.  Hist. 779. 
Woodruff, E.  H.,  History of  Chancery  in  Massachusetts, s Law Quart.  Rev. 370 
(1889). 
Of course much will be found in the standard works on Equity_ not  mentioned  above such 
as Abbott's Cases (1909), Adams (1850 and later editions),  Beach  (1892),  Bispham (1878 and 
later editions), Eaton (1906), Hutchins and  Bunker's  Cases  (1902),  Langdcll (1904), Pomeroy 
(1881 and later editions), Smith, II. A. (1908), Snell, G. H. T. (13th 
F.d. 1901 ), Story  (1836 and  later editions). 
"'.Maitland, Lectures  on  Equity,   p.   23. 63 
lb. p. 24. 
"'Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. I,  p.  *435,  Kent,  Com.,  Vol.  4,  p.  *289. Bernard's  
First  Year  of  Roman  Law,  U  813­818;   Roby,  Roman   Private  Law,  Vol.  I,  p. 356. 
.. Maitland, Equity, p. 32; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol. 
II, p. 239. 
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is already employing it; by  the  intermediation  of  a  third  person, whom 
he puts in seisin of his lands and goods, he succeeds in ap­ pointing or 
adopting an heir." 56 MAITLAND  finds the same thing  in  the  Lombard  
law.     He  says:  "Th  Lombard  cannot  make  a genuine 
er  testament. He  therefore  transfers  the  whole  or  some  part  of his 
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property to a Treiiliander, who is to carry  out  his  instructions." , Mr. 
Justice  HOLMES  says  that  "The  feoffee  to  uses  of  the  early   
English   law,  corresponds   point   by   point   to  the  Salman 
of   the  early  German  law.  * * * The  Salman,  like  the  feoffee,  was 
a person, to whom land was transferred  in  order  that  he  might make  
a  conveyance   according   to  his  grantor's   directions,  * * * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ut or  usually after the grantor's death, the grantor reserving the use of 
the land himself during his life. To meet the chance of the  Sal­  man's 
death before the time for the conveyance over, it  was com­ mon to 
employ more' than one, and persons of importance were selected for 
the office. The essence of the relation was the fiducia 
 
m an or trust reposed in the fide/is nianus, who sometimes confirmed his 
obligation   by   an   oath   or   covenant.   * *  * The    executor   of  the 
early  German  will was simply a Salman  whose duty  it  was  to see 
o legacies and so forth paid if the heirs refused. * * * There can 
be no doubt  of  the  identity  of  the  continental  executor  and  the officer 
of the same name described by GLANVILLE ( r18o) ; and thus the 
connection between the English and the German law is made certain.58 
"The beneficiary had however no action to compel the perfor­ mance 
of the duty of the continental Salman," 59 and "the transform­ ation of 
the honorary obligation of the f eoffee into a legal obliga­ tion was a 
purely English development."00 This duty was enforced against 
executors in the case of bequests  of  personal  property,  in the 
ecclesiastical courts, and possibly to some extent in the case of lands 
devisable by custom in some of the cities.61 
For a long time even before the Conquest the term use  had  been in 
use, but yet as MAITLAND wittily says, it has "mistaken its own 
, origin." The   word  is  not  the  Latin  "usus"   ( i.  e.  a  using   of a 
thing),  but the Latin  opus.  From  the 7th and 8th centuries, ad' opus, 
for  "on  his  behalf,"  is  found  in  Lombard  and  Frank  documents; 
• 1 Trust and Corporations, 3 Coll. Papers, p. 327• 
.. Holmes Early Eng. Equity, I Law Quart. Rev. 162­174  (1885); Select Essays Anglo­
Am. Leg. Hist., Vol. z, p. 705. Maitland, Equity, p. 26. 
•• Note  4,  Ames,  Lectures  on  Legal  History,  Origin   of   Uses,   p.   237.  2   Select 
Essays Anglo­Am. Leg. Hist., 737 et seq. 
00 Ames, Lectures on Legal Hist. p. 237. 
61 Ames, lb., p. 235; Holmes, Early Eng. Equity, 2 Select Essays Anglo­Am. Leg. 
Hist., pp. 710­714. 
etim es  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ians .” 
­ rs ­ 
in the Old French these become "al oes,  ues,"  which  the  English tongue, 
confused with "use." The Latin records however read ad opus,­ad opus 
Johann·is, i. e. on behalf of John. As far back as Domesday Book, one 
person is constantly doing things ad optts an­ other; the Sheriff seizes "ad 
opus Regis, as os le Roy." 02  If  one  is going  on  a  crusade  he  
occasionally  conveyed   his  land   to  another to be held to the  use  of  his  
children,  or  his  wife  or  sister,  for  he was not certain whether a woman 
could  hold  a  military  fee,  or  whether he could  enfeoff  his  wife.  So  
too,  a  man  might  want  to give his property to a convent, to the  use  of  
the  library,  or  the hospital.  And  when  the  Franciscan  friars  came  as  
missionaries  to the  English  towns,  about  1225,  with  their  rule  forbidding  
them  to own anything,  the  faithful  benefactor,  who  wanted  to  give  
them some poor dormitory in which to live and  sleep,  struck  upon  the 
curious plan  of  conveying  a  house  to  the  borough  community  "to the  
use  of,"  or  "as  an  inhabitation  for"  the  friars.   And   by   the time of 
BRACTON, "plots of land in  London  had  been  thus  con­ veyed to the 
city for the benefit of the F ranciscians."63 This was 
n in the 13th century. 
In the 14th century, landowners began conveying lands  to  their 
friends  a.d  qpus  suum,  to  the  use of  themselves. Why? Because 
 
dren. they have found they can in effect make a will of their lands in 
this way; for if A conveys his lanrl to B to hold  on  behalf  of  A while 
he lives, and then when A dies to give it to some one sug­ gested by A 
before he dies, it is equivalent to a will.  The  direct devise of lands 
under the feudal system had been denied to land­ owners for two  or  
three  centuries.  Men  especially  among  the great want  to provide  
for  their daughters  and younger  sons.  John of Gaunt wants to provide 
for his illegitimate children. There were other reasons also; to avoid the 
feudal burdens of wardship, mar­ riage, forfeitures and escheats, the 
statutes of mortmain,­and  per­ haps also to defraud one's creditors.e. 
Between 1396 and 1403, the Chancellor had interfered to protect these 
beneficiaries, and is ordering defendants by the writ of subpcena, "to  
do whatever  shall be ordained by us," or to "do what right and good 
faith," or "good faith and conscience" demand, since the plaintiff 
"cannot  have remedy by the law of the Holy church nor  by  the 
common  law ;05 and one great doctrine, "Equity acts upon the person," 
was taking 
a Maitland, Equity, p. 24. See Note,  Pollock  and  Maitland,  Hist. of  Eng.  Law,  2d 
Ed., Vol. II, p. 233. 
• Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 2, 2d Ed., p. 231. 
"Maitland, Equity, pp. 25­30. 
11 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Origin of Uses, Note 3, p.  236, and note 1, 
p. 238. 
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shape. "The law regards chiefly the right of the plaintiff and gives 
judgment that he recover the land, debt, or damages  because  they, are 
his. Equity lays stress upon the duty of the  defendant,  and decrees that. 
he do or  refrain  from  doing  a  certain  thing  because he ought to act 
or forbear."88 
This term 'ad opus' in the early time was used also for what  we now 
use "agency." In the very ancient days both in France and England, a 
man, such as the King's officer, will receive money  not  as agent of, 
but to the use of, ad opits, the king, or some one  else;  and in time, 
where the party is authorized to do some act in refer­ ence to money or 
chattels on behalf of another, as  where A's  bail­ iff, B, takes A's corn 
to market,  sells  it, and  buys  cattle,  ad  opus A, this develops into a 
law of agency, so that if B converts  the corn or cattle or money 
received to his own use (ad opus suum proprium) the common law will 
recognize the wrong and furnish a remedy in debt or  account.87 
It was not so however in the case of land, although it looks much 
like a contract, and there certainly is an agreement when "in con­ 
sidef'ation of a conveyance made by A to X, Y, Z, they agree that they 
will hold the land for the behoof of A, will allow  him to enjoy it, and 
will convey it as he shall direct."69 Why is this not a con­ 
tract,  and  why  did   the  court·s   not enforce   it? There are two 
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or three reasons: (I) The feofee did not formally promise ,  or covenant 
under his seal; (2) In the 14th century  the common  law had not begun 
to enforce 'the simple contract,' and by the 15th century when the 
simple contract began to be enforced in the courts of common law,'' in 
an action of assumpsit, the Chancellor was already in possession of this 
field of jurisdiction and was already enforcing uses by means of  a  
procedure  far  more  efficient  and far 
. more flexible than  any  which  the old  courts  could  have employed; 
(3) Where the promise was to convey as directed  after  the  death  of 
the . feoffor, of course the feoffor could not enforce it, his heir would 
not, for it would be to his interest not  to do so ; so the only one wanting 
to enforce it would be the beneficiary; the court of Chancery early 
recognized this, and gave him the remedy, and even in the earliest 
instances where the trustor  and  the cestui que use10  are the same, still 
it is  as  "destinatory,"  not  as  "author  of  the trust"  that  he  has  the  
remedy.    This  marks  it  off   from contract. 
(4) Then again if the feoffor who was also the cesttti qtte use, had 
 
 
"'Ames lb., p. 231. 
81 Pollock and Maitland, History of Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol. II, pp. 229, 230. 
• lb., p. 231. 
00 Maitland, Equity, p. 28. 
ro On the proper use of this term, and ccstui quc trust, see 26 Law Quart. Rev. 196. 
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s only a contract right, it would be a chose in action, and inalienable, 
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which the landowner did not want. 71 
And so what kind of a right is this which the destinatory, th 
beneficiary, the cestui que use, has? Is it a right in rem or in per­ 
sonam? To follow MAITLAND here: "It  seems  a  little  of  both."72 
"The right of cestui que use or cestui que trust begins by being a 
on right in personam. Gradually it begins to look somewhat like a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ion  
right in rem.18 But it never has become this, no, not even in the 
present day." "The new class of rights is made to  look as  much like 
rights in rem (estates in land) as the Chancellor can make them look; 
that is in harmony with the real wish of the parties who are using the 
device. They are also taking the common law as their model. Thus 
we get a conversion of the use into an incorporeal thing,­in which 
estates and interests exist,­a sort of  immaterial­ ized piece of 
land."H "The use came to be conceived  of  as a sort of metaphysical 
entity in which there might be estates very similar 
ffee 
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to those which could be created in land, estates in possession, re­ 
mainder,  reversion,  estates descendible  in  this way or  tha t."76  But it 
is "neither jus i1' re nor ad rem, neither right, title nor interest in law, 
but a species of property unknown to the common law, and owing  its  
existence  to  the  equitable  jurisdiction  of  chancery, rest­ 
ing  upon  confidence  in  the  person  and  privity  of  estate;  * * * it 
was rather a hold upon the conscience of  the f eoffee to uses than  a  a 
lien upon, or  interest  in  the land; and  the  principle  upon  which  it 
was founded was that the feoffee was bound in conscience to fol­ low 
the direction of the f eoffo r."76 
"The trustee is the owner, the full owner of the thing, while the 
cestui que trust has no rights in the thing." 77 
um  This  thing,­the  trust  res,  or  trust  fund  owned  by  the trustee 
the  court  of  chancery  converted   into  an  incorporeal   thing which 
,  can change  its dress  but maintain  its identity.  "Today  it appears as 
a piece of land; tomorrow it may be some gold coins rn a purse; 
n Maitland, Equity, pp. 28­31. 
12 lb.,  p. 23. 
13 lb.,  p. 29• 
.. lb.,  p. JI. 
15 lb.,  p. 33. 
"Stebbins,  Senator,   in  McCartee  v.  Orphan's  Asylum   (1827),  9  Cowen   (N.  Y.) 
437,  18   Am.  Dec.  516,   I   Wilgus,  Corp.   Cas.  1021.    Wehner   v.  Thurmond   (1908),  17 
Wyo.  268,  129  Am.  St.  R.  111  3,  98  Pac.  590,  99  Pac:.  1 128.   On  the   nature  of   a   trust, see 
particularly cases in  Ames's   Cases  on  Trusts,  Secs.  I  to  V,  pp.   1­77,  Ch.  I;  Secs.  I and  II,   
Ch.   II,    pp.  235­278.    Hart,   W.  G.,  The   place  of   trust   in   jurisprudence   (1912), 28 Law Q. 
Rev. 290; Whitlock,  A.  N.,  Classification  of   the   law   of   trusts  {1913),  1  Cal. Law Rev. pp. 
215­221. 
11 Maitland, Equity, p. 47. Ames's Cases, Ch. II, Sec. II, pp. 235­278; Kenneson'a 
Cases, Ch. II, pp. 111­152. 
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then it will be a sum of Consols; then it  will be shares  in  a Rail­  way 
Company; and then Peruvian Bonds. When all is going well, changes 
of investment may often be made; the trustees have been given  power  
to  make  them.   All  along the  'trust  f11nd'  retains its 
identity.  * * * But  the  same  idea  is applied  even  when  all  is not 
going well." 78 
Mr. MAITLAND contends stoutly, and perhaps correctly, notwith­ 
standing frequent loose statements to the  contrary,  that  the  bene­ ficiary 
has no right in the thing, in the trust fund; the equitable 
e 
estates and  interests  are  not  jura in  rem;  *  * *  but  essentially jura 
le in personam, not rights against the world at large but rights against 
certain persons.70 Notwithstanding this, the beneficiary is treated as 
having an estate in fee simple, or  in  fee  tail, or  for  life in  the 
use or trust, or an equitable estate ; or as having a term of  years  in the 
use or trust.  These estates  and  interests  were  to  devolve  and be 
transmitted like the analogous estates  and  interests  known  to and  
protected by the common law.   The equitable fee would descend 
d to  heirs  general,  the  equitable  estates  tail to heirs  in tail, equitable 
; chattel  interests  would  pass  to  the  executors  or administrators. 
* * * The equitable estate or interest could be conveyed or  as­  
signed  inter vivos; and  they can be devised  or  bequeathed ; curtesy 
 
 
 
rs , but not dower could be had in them ; they did not escheat; and they 
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could be reached by a creditor of the beneficiary. 
All these look like rights in rem. Yet "the right of the cestui que 
trust is the benefit of an obligatioa,"80 and is available against not 
the whole world, but only against certain persons; these are: (I) The 
trustee who has undertaken to hold in trust; ( 2) "those who come to 
the lands or goods by inheritance or succession from the original 
trustee, his heir, executors, administrators, or doweress; 
n 
(3) the trustees creditors; (4) the trustees donee, who takes with­ 
out giving a valuable consideration; (S) the purchaser fr'om the 
trustee for value, who knows of the trust; (6) the purchaser from the 
trustee who ought to know of the trust," "who would have known of 
the trust had he behaved as prudent purchasers behave,"­ according 
to the estimate of equity judges,­and not of an ordinary jury. If he 
did not come up to this standard he was "affected with notice," or 
had "constructive notice," and was not protected.81 
"Ilut here a limit  was  reached.   Against  a  person  who  acquires a 
legal right bona fide, for value, without notice express or con­ 
 
'"Maitland, Trust and Corporation, 3 Coll. Papers, pp. 350­351, 
n Maitland, Equity, p. 112, et seq. Langdell, Equity, pp. 5­6, 254 (2d Ed.). 
., lb., p. 116. But compare Mr. Whitlock's article in 1  Cal.  Law  Rev.  215,  and 
Bispham'• and Pomeroy'• Classifications. 
11 Maitland, Equity, pp. 117­119. 
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structive of the existence of equitable rights those rights are of no 
avail,''­and here is the difference between the  beneficiary's  right, and 
a true right in rem.82 
Creation  of Corporations. 
Long ago, Lord CoKE in the Case of Sutton's Hospital, said these 
"things are of  the essence  of  a  corporation:  (I)  Lawful  authority of  
incorporation; and  that  may  be  by  four means,  sc. by the com­ 
; 
mon  law,  as  the  King  himself,  etc.;  by  authority   of  parliament; 
.  by the King's Charter, (as in  this case) ; and  by  prescription.  The 2d 
which is of the essence of the incorporation, are parties to be in­ 
corporated, and that in two manners, sc. persons natural, or bodies 
incorporate and political. ( 3) A name by which they are incor­ porated, 
as in this case governors of the lands, etc.  (4)  Of a place, for  without  
a  place  no incorporation  can be made;  here  the place 
is in the charter  house in  the  County  of  Middlesex.  * * *  (5) By 
words sufficient in law, but not restrained to any certain legal and 
prescript form of words." 88 
This  statement,  for  the most  part  is  as  applicable  and accurate 
re today  as it  was three  hundred  years ago when  it  was  written. We 
d yet  have corporations  existing  by  the common  law,­as the state 
itself is a corporation, and our governors and officers are corpora­ tions 
sole for certain purposes, by implication or necessity.84 Public 
corporations may exist with us by prescription, and private also, where  
the statute of  limitations  runs  against  the  state in  quo war­ 
on ranto proceedings.n   We still have corporations  in  this country  that 
exist by virtue of  a  King's  charter  granted  before  the  revolution,  as in 
the case of Dartmouth College.86 This method of creating cor­ porations de 
novo, still exists in England, but of course not  with  us ; and although 
Lord BALTIMORE, under authority conferred upon him by the Charter 
of Maryland in. 1667 incorporated the  Mayor,  Re­ corder, Aldermen and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  St.  Marys, and William PENN, by a 
similar provision in the Charter of Penn­ sylvania, in 1701 granted a 
charter of incorporation to the city of 
62 l b., p. 119. 
"'The Case of Sutton's· Hospital (1613) 10 Coke 1, 23a et seq., 1 Wilgus Cases, 
p. 264. 
81 The Governor v. Allen (1847), 8 Humph. (27 Tenn.) 176, 1 Wilgus, Corp. Cases, 
70, note 27 5. 
.., Greene v. Dennis (1826), 6 Conn. 292, 16 Am. Dec. 58, 1 Wilgus Cases, 275, note 
78; State v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Co. (1867), 8 R. I. 521, 94 Am.  Dec.  123;  People  v. 
Oakland Co. Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 285. 
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. \Voodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.), 518, 
1 \Vilgus, Corp. Cas. 708. 
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Philadelphia,87 no such power now  exists  with  us in any executive 
or  judicial  office.  And  since the American  revolution  the power to 
d create corporations,  with us, has resided in our legislative bodies  ex­ 
clusively.88 Such power, however, when in our legislatures, is quali­ 
fied only  by constitutional limitations.89  And in the absence of  con­ 
stitutional  provision  the  legislature  may  act  by  special  or general 
laws. General incorporation laws probably existed at Rome.00 In 
England the first general incorporation law was enacted by Parlia­ ment 
in 1597 for the erection of hospitals; this was made  perpetual  in 1624; 
it is still in force, and Lord COKE, in his Second Institute gives the act 
and a proper form for incorporation under it.91 The political dogmas of 
the American and French revolutions,  that all men are created equal, 
and are entitled to equal rights, issued in the demand for equal 
privileges in the formation of corporations. 
. To satisfy this demand and prevent the fraud and legislative job­ 
bery incident to the granting of the privileges of incorporation by 
special acts, it became the policy to incorporate under general laws. 
As early as 1784, general laws were passed in New York for the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ss ar y . incorporation of Churches; these were followed rapidly in other 
states. In r8u, New  York  passed  the  first  general  incorporation law 
for incorporating manufacturing corporations. This was fol­ lowed in 
Massachusetts in 1836; in Connecticut and Michigan in 1837; and by 
Indiana in 1838.9 2 
But passing general laws did not meet the  whole  difficulty,  for the 
legislatures continued to create corporations under special acts. 
Constitutional limitations therefore became necessary. In 1821 New 
York required the assent of two­thirds of the members  of  both houses 
of its legislature. 
In 1838 Florida by constitutional provision forbade the incorpora­ 
tion of churches by special act, and directed that a general law be 
; enacted for their creation. In 1845 Louisiana did the same for all except  
municipal  corporations.    In  1846  New  York  did likewise; 
;  sr Mc Kim v. Odom. 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, 1 Wilgus  Corp.  Cas.  222;  1  Wilson's Works. 
(Andrews' Ed.), 561; Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, p. 3, note 3· 
s Poorc's Charters Vol. 2, p. 1388, Par. 14 (North Carolina). 
""Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood (1853), 14 Ga. So, I Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 279, 
note 286. 
""Bell v. Bank of Nashville (1823), Peck (7 Tenn.) 269; Penobscot Boom Corp. v. 
Lamson (1839), 16 Me. (4 Shep) 224, 33 Am. Dec. 656, 1 \Vilgus, Corp. Cas. 283; 1 Hamilton's 
Works, iii; 1 Wilson's Works, 561;  Luxton  v.  North  River  Bridge  Co. (1894), l 53 U. S. 
525. 
oo Baldwin, Modern  Political Institutions,  Freedom  of Incorporation. 
•1 39 Eliz. Ch. 5 (1597); 21 Jas. 1, Ch. 1, (1624); 2 Inst., p. 723; 6 Encyc. of Laws 
of England 233• 
.. Note (b) 2 Kent's Com. p. [342]. Laws of New York 1784, 7 Secs., Ch. 18; 
Laws of N. Y., 18II, Ch. 67, 3 Secs. Notes I and 2, I Machen, Corp. p. 15. 
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er s  and now almost every state constitution provides that the legisla­ 
tures  shall  pass  no  special  act  creating  corporations  or conferring 
. corporate powers, but all corporations  shall be created  under general 
e laws which  shall  be subject  to amendment  and  repeal  by the legis­ 
t lature at any time.03 Mr. 
in only seven state s.04 
FROST says special charters can be granted 
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In speaking of the general incorporation laws, J\fr. l\L\CHEN says, "The 
statutes in some states consist of a jumble of old acts thrown together 
almost indiscriminately with more recent amendments. In other states, 
the legisatures have intended to display the utmost lib­ erality; but 
unfortunately this disposition has often been evinced by removing 
salutary restrictions and at the same time, in order to 
.” 
make a show of legislative regulation, by imposing vexatious and 
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unreasoning  restraints."0 
1r. FROST says that "a great majority of the business corporation 
acts in force in this country today are sadly in need of revision. 
* * * The incorporation laws of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Mary­ land 
are veritable "legal antiques," * * * and the acts of many of 
the states are "wonderfully and fearfully made." 96  And every law­  yer 
that has tried to find out the real meaning of the corporation statutes of 
a single state, knows that such mild expressions are alto­ 
me gether too euphonious to do the subject justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dual  
Not only are incorporation laws notoriously uncertain in  mean­ ing, 
but they are inflexible so long as they last, and when, in what way, and 
to what extent, they will be changed by the legislature, 
y Providence only, if anyone, can tell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nded. Then again one must at his peril substantially comply with the 
law whether he can determine its meaning or not;  and  in  many states 
if he fails so to comply he can only say some sort of disaster will follow, 
exactly what under the present state of authorities, he 
 
 
orati ons , cannot tell, for it is concealed in gremio legis et curiae; in one place 
it will be de facto existence ;97 in another not ;98 in one a full part­ nership 
liability for members; in another an individual liability for participant 
s,1 00 ­   but  for   all,  even  though  they  acted  in  good  faith, it will be 
something different from what they intended. 
• Private  Corporations,  \Vilgus,  p.  u8,  Const.  Fla.  1838,  Art.  13,  Sec.  1;   Louis­ 
iana Const. 1845; New York Const. 1821, Art. 7, Sec. 9; Const. 1846, Art. 8, Sec. 3. 
°' Frost, Incorporation and Organization of Corporations, p. 2 (4th Ed). 
'° Machen, Corp. p. 17, 
00 Frost, Inc. & Organ. Corp. pp. 3, 7 (4th Ed.). 
"Finnegan v. Noerenberg (1893), 52 Minn. 239, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 1 Wilgus, 
Cases, 614. 
IAI Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bank (1881). 56 Ia. 104, 1 Wilgus, Cases 607; Berge• 
ron v. Hobbs (1897), 96 Wis. 641, 65 Am.  St.  R.  85,  1  Wilgus, Cases 611. 
.. :Martin v.  Fewell  (1883), 79 Mo. 401, 1 Wilgus, Cases 673, note 676, 
100 Fay v. Noble (1851), 7 Cush. (Mass.), 188, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 677, note 681. 
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s Then too it is difficult, if not impossible, unless the Supreme 
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Court has passed upon it, to say what is the period of corporate 
gestation, when it begins or when it ends, when  corporate  birth really 
occurs, when corporate parturition is complete, when the um­ bilical 
cord is cut, and the corporate "personality'' is acquired. For example, 
where the statute reads that  "articles  of  incorporation shall he 
executed stating name, purpose, place of business, term, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
orat e number of directors, names of those for first year, amount of cap­ 
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ital stock,  and  number  of  shares,  and  shall  be  filed  in  the  office  of the 
secretary of state, and  thereupon  the  signers  shall  be  a  corpora­ tion,"  at  
least   four   different   views   are   taken:   (1)   Corporate  life for all  
purposes  begins  immediately  on  filing  the  articles,  ipso  facto eo 
i11sta11ti, without reference to any stock subscription or organiza­ tion.101    
( 2)    There  is  no  corporate   life  until  corpdrate  r,rganization. 
by  election  or  appointment  of  officers.  102   (3)      There  is only  a quali­ 
fied corporate existence resulting from filing articles and adult cor­ porate  
life only after  the requisite stock  is subscribed  and  paid in.103 
, (4) Corporate life begins on the filing, but the incorporators whether 
subscribing for stock or not, are tenants in common of the proposed 
amount until it is duly subscribed by others.104 
e Creation of E.rpress Trnsts. 
Upan the other hand the creation of  an express  trust  is a  matter 
of  the  mere declaration  of  the tmstor  or declarant, accepted  by the 
d trustee, or of  a contract  between them.105 There are no special  stat­ 
 
 
 
ti ons  utes to comply with except the Statute of Frauds, the Statute of 
d Uses, statutes relating to Perpetuities, and to Conveyancing and Re­ 
cording. 
These will be considered in other connections. At this  point  it  is only 
necessary to say that for !:he most part  these  are  easily  com­ plied with. 
The Express Trust is a  matter  of  a  declaration  of  an owner or of an 
agreement between parties under their common law rights and  can  be  
moulded  to  suit  the  needs  an­: wishes of  the par­ 
ties, and it can be made as certain, definite and clear as the skill of the 
draftsman will permit in expressing the intentions o: the par­ 
ties,106­and  it  will at least  not be defeated  by incorrect  gues!:es at 
the meaning of uncertain, if not inconsistent,  provisions  of  written law. 
The balance here certainly is in favor of the trust. 
101 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Peck  (1896), 9 S.  Dak. 29, 67  N.  W.  947, 1 Wilgus,  Cases  571. 
102 W alton v. Oliver (1892), 49 Kans. 107, 33 Am. St. R. 355, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 565. 
""'Wechselberg  v.  Flour  City   National   Bank   (1894),  24  U.   S.   App.  308,   1 Wilgus, 
Cases, 574. 
1°' Hawes  v.  Anglo­Saxon  Petroleum  Co.  (1869),  101  Mass.  385,  1  Wilgus,  Cases  581. 
too Maitland, Equity, pp. 53­56. 
'"" lb., 57­70. 
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Steps in Creation of Corporations. 
er  Mr. FROST enumerates107 the various steps necessary to create a 
e 
corporation under modern business corporation acts, as follows: 
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, 
(I) The drafting of the articles of incorporation; 
( 2) The signing of the articles by the requisite number of incor­ 
porators, and the acknowledgement of the same before an officer 
<luly authorized to take such acknowledgements; 
(3) Filing and recording the articles with the proper state and county 
officials after payment of the requisite organization tax and filing and 
recording fees; 
( 4)   Organization  of  the  corporation  ready  for  the  transaction of 
busine,;s; 
( 5)  Securing ·the  necessary   permit  from  state  officials   ( if   any is 
required), to transact business in the domiciliary state. 
Steps in Creation of Trust. 
On the other hand a recent case has said the requisites of a valid trust 
are: " (I) A designated beneficiary; (2) a designated trustee, 
nt  who must not be the beneficiary; (3) a fund or other property suffi­ 
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ter .” 
ciently designated or identified to enable title thereto to pass to the 
trustee; and  (4)  the actual  delivery  of  the fund or  other  property, or 
of a legal assignment thereof to the trustee, with the intention of passing 
legal title thereto to him as trustee."108 
Let us consider these things a little more fully in reference to the 
creation of Corporations and of Trusts. 
The focorporation Paper. 
Under all general incorporation laws, some kind of a document 
ey  
must be executed in a particular way, and filed, deposited, or record­ 
ed, in a specific way. The  name of  this document  is various,­"deed of 
settlement," "articles of association," "articles of incorporation," 
"articles," ';certificate  of  incorporation,"  "charter,"  "memorandum of 
association,"­all of which Mr. 1\focmm considers objectionable, and 
suggests that "incorporation paper'' be  used,  although  as  he says, that 
"term does not seem to have been used in any state or country." 100    It 
seems however  that  it is not  fatal to call it  Articles of Association 
when it ought to be called " Charter." 110 
lDT Frost, Inc. and Org. Corp., p. 12 (4th Ed.). 
100  Brown  v.  Spohr,  180  N.  Y.  201,  209,  73  N.  E.  14,  16;   Central  Trust  Co.   v. 
Gaffney,  142  N.  Y.  S.  902,  905,  157  App.  D.  501.    Kemmerer  v.  Kemmerer   (1908),  233 
Ill 327, 122 Am.  St.  R.  169,  84  N.  E.  256;  Ranney  v.  Byers  (1908),  219  Pa.  332,  123 
Am. St. R. 66o, 68 Atl. 971. 
100 Machen, Corporations, p. 30, I 32. 
110 Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bk. (1881), 56 Ia. 104, 1 Wilgus, Cases 6o7, on 6o8. 
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In any event there must be a written or printed incorporation paper.m 
The drafting of this document,  under  printed  forms,  that are usually 
furnished upon application seems to be a simple matter, and is often 
done without much professional consider:ition. How­ ever since the 
document, will constitute, together with the law under which it is 
executed, a contract of a dual nature,­one between the 
ati on  
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corporation and the state, and another among the shareholders them­ 
selves,11 to be construed "rig­idly in favor of the public and against the 
corporation ;"11 3 and since the express powers of  a  corporation are such 
as are found expressed in the statute under which the cor­ poration is 
to be forn1ed, or such, as though not so expressed,  may be lawfully 
claimed, if specified in the incorporation paper. though not otherwise, 
much skill is required to get the best results.rn Mr. FROST enumerates 
28 different classes of express pO\vers, 21 of which are expressed in 
most general laws, but 7 of which if desired. must 
 
orat e usually be claimed in the incorporation paper, if they can be had at 
all ;m and, although formerly it was held that one state could not spawn  
its corporate progeny  to do business  in another state, yet that 
e view has been abandoned so completely that the states have become 
unseemly competitors in vending their corporate wares, to such an 
extent that every important business seeking incorporation  asks where 
can  the incorporation  be had with a maximum  of  power, and 
te a  minimum  of_  inconvenience;  so  where  to  incorporate  has become 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l es  a question of extreme importance, and can be answered only par­ tially 
by any lawyer after careful investigation and comparison of statutes. 
Mr. FROST suggests 21 ciuestions to be answered in this connection, and 
these certainly do not cover more than half the ground; all these 
considerations make it certain that the proper drafting of important 
incorporation papers requires a high degree of 
 
 
 
 
102.  skill and experience.U6 
The incorporation paper must be executed as the statute provides, 
and there are many pitfalls here also. If the statute sa ·s that "any 
number" may form a corporation, by signing articles of association, 
and stating, among other things, the "names and residence'' of the 
signers. and there are 27 signers, but only two state their residences, 
the corporation in Indiana, at least, is not de jure;m so too if the 
= Utley v. Union Tool Co. (1858), 11 Gray (Mass.), 139, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 597. 
112 ilachen, Corporations, pp. 32­33 ; Wilgus, Corp. Cases, p. 707 et seq. 
UJ Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Co. (1888), 130 U. S. 1, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 429. 
114 Machen, Corporations, H 48­63, 64­102. 
110 Frost, Inc. & Org. of Corporations, 4th Ed., U 17, 18, pp. 34­36. 
11•     lb.   I  18,  p.  35.    Wilgus,   Corporations,  I  49. 
m Busenback v. Attica &c. Road Co. (1873), 43 Ind. 265, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 600. 
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residence  of  directors  is  omitted  when  the  statute  requires  it;  so 
s  where the ''principal place  of business"  is  to be stated, it  won't  do to 
say "the operations of the company are to be carried on"11 8 in a certain 
county; and in :Maryland it seems that even a church, though it has 
been running as an incorporated body for years, taking a deed for its 
property, giving a mortgage upon it, issuing bonds, etc., can­ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
os ed  not be held liable for its just debts, if its articles were acknowledged 
before only one justice of the peace, when two were required. 110 And 
in \Vi consin, where the statute requires the certificate of organiza­ tion 
to be filed with the register of deeds,­and where the original 
d, 
certificate of  organization  was left  with  the  recorder,  long enough 
e to be  recorded  in his office, and  was so  recorded  by copying  in the 
 
 
 
 
 
ey;  record books, and was then returned to the supposed corporation, 
instead of being left on file in the recorder's office, there was neither 
y a corporation de jzire nor de f acto.1 0 
ati on  
es  Then  too  the  incorporation   fee,  varying  from  a  few  dollars in 
on some states to a large sum in others must  be paid, or there is, at least, 
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, 
in Colorado, neither a corporation de j11re, de facto nor by esto pp el.121 
In Arizona it would have cost $45 to incorporate the United States Steel 
Corporation; it cost $220,000 in New Jersey; and it would  have cost in 
Pennsylvania, $3,666,666.1 22 
I have already spoken sufficiently of the variety of view, and con­ 
flict of authority as to when the corporate organization is complete. and 
real corporate birth occurs. Under the statutes of many states certain 
things must be done before the corporation can "commence business," 
and there has l;ieen much difficulty to determine the result of a failure 
to do all these things. Perhaps  it is  reasonably  safe to  say that if the 
duty to do these things  before  commencing  business is placed by the 
statute upon those seeking incorporation, such  will  be a mandatory 
condition precedent to valid corporate existence : whereas if the duty 
seems to be rather upon the corporation,  instead of those seeking 
incorporation, it will be a condition subsequent; but in either case the 
state can bring quo warranto, in the one  case  against the unsuccessful 
incorporators, in the other against the de­ faulting corporation, disaster 
being possible in either case.123 
 
 
ua Harris & Stickle v. McGregor (1865), 29 Cal. 124, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 6o3. 
m Boyce v. Trustees &c. (1876), 46 Md. 359, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 642. 
:uo Bergeron  v.  Hobbs  (1897),  96  Wis.  641,  65  Am.  St.   R.  85,  1  Wilgus,  Cases, 611. 
121 Jones  v.  Aspen  Hardware  Co.  (1895),  21  Colo.  263,  52  Am.  St.  R.  220,  I Wilgus, 
Cases, 637. 
122 Frost, Inc. & Org. Corp,, 4th Ed., Table iii. 
uo Mokelumne Hill Mining Co. v. Woodbury (1859), 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658, 
1 Wilgus, Cases 296; Harrod v. Hamer, (1873), 32 Wis. 162, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 586. 
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Trust Instrument. 
Now let tts see how it stands with an Express  Trust.  MAITLAND says: 
"In  the old  days  no deed, no writing  was  necessary  to create a use, 
trust or confidence. I enfeoff you, and by word of mouth I 
 
 
 
 
 
lar e declare that you are to hold to the use of X. You must hold to the 
use of X. As to trusts this still is law, except in so far as it has been 
altered by the Statute of F rauds." 1 24 
The Statute of Frauds of 1677, provided (§ 7) that "All declara­ 
y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
edgem ent  
tions of or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements or 
hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed 
by the party who is by law enabled  to declare such  trust, or by his last 
will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of no effect," but 
by section 8, this was not to apply where the trust results "by the 
implication or construction of law." 1 2 
al  
It is to be noted here that this statute applies only to real property, 
aud not personal property ;1 26 that writing only, not a deed, no sealed 
instrument, no witness, no acknowledgement is necessary; and fur­ ther 
no writing is necessary to create the trust, but only to manifest and  
prove it   "The statute will  be satisfied  if  the trust  can  be man­ 
ds  
ifested and proved by any subsequent acknowledgement by the trust­ 
ee, as by an express declaration by him or by a memorandum to that 
effect, or by a letter under his hand, or by a recital in a deed exe­ cuted 
by him ; and the trust, however late the proof, operates retro­ spectively  
from  the time of  its  creation."1 21      But  Courts  of Equity 
d 
went further and held "the Statute of  Frauds  does  not  prevent  the proof 
of fraud," and "it is a fraud for a  person  who  knows land  has been 
conveyed to him in trust, to deny the trust and claim the land himself." 1 28 
In a few states this section of the Statute of Frauds is not in force, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ad, 
and in a few, a deed instead of merely a writing is required, but in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
es , most states the statute is in force with the effect above given.1 29 
As noted it does not apply to personal property, nor does it require 
a contract or consideration to make one a trustee.130 
The 9th section of this statute however required  that every grant  
or assignment of a trust, that is the beneficial interest, "be in writing," 
12' Maitland, Equity, p. 57. 
'"' 29 Chas. II, c. 3. Maitland's Equity, p. 57; Ranney v. Byers, (1908), 219 Pa. 
332, 123 Am. St. R. 660, 68 Atl. 971; Ames, Cases, I 8, pp. 176­189. 
"° Maitland, Equity, pp. 58­59. 
m Lewin, Trusts, 11th Ed., p. 56; Maitland, Equity, p. 58. 
121 Maitland, Equity, 59; Rochefoucauld v. Bonstead, (1897), 1 Ch. 196. 
121 Cook, Trusts & Tusttees, I 53; Ames, Cases, pp, 176­177. 
130 Maitland, Equity, p. 53; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, §I 45­47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g 
­27­ 
an<l  not  merely  manifested  or  proved  by  a  w riting. 1 31      So  too  the I 
3th Elizabeth forbidding all conveyances  to  delay,  hinder  or  de­ fraud, 
creditors: and the 2ith Elizabeth forbidding voluntary con­ veyances   to  
defraud   and  deceive  subsequent   purchasers,  of  course, 
, apply  to  conveyances  in  trnst  as  well as  to  other conveyances. These 
:i.re generally in force in this country ­132 
To    quote  M,\ITL\ND  again:    "The  creation  of   a   trust   may   be a 
n perfectly  unilateral  act, there may  not  be more than one  party  to it. 
 
 
ul d ,:, * " I declare myself a trustee of this watch for my son who is in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tanc e 
India. If I afterwards sell that watch, although my son has never 
heard of the benefit  that I  had intended  for  him, I commit a breach 
of trust and my son has an equitable cause of action against me." 1 33 
While it is usually said that "no one can be compelled to undertake 
a trust," yet because courts of  Equity  have been  so  jealous of  its 
pet, L\ITLAND points out "In practice it would not be very sage to 
rely upon this doctrine, for one may  very  easily  do  something or say 
something that can be regarded as an acceptance of  the  trust" with all 
its attendant  duties, that cannot  be easily got  rid  of. "There­ 
y  fore if  you  hear that  anyone has been  conveying  property  to you as 
a trustee, and you do not  wish to be burdened  with a  trustee's duties, 
 
ided  you will be wise in repudiating in some emphatic manner the rights 
and the duties which were to have been thrust upon you." 134 
e,  Ko specific words are  necessary.  "The words 'use' and 'trust' are 
not sacramental  terms."   In  fact "the most untechnical words,"  mere 
h  precatory words, such as "desire," "will," "request," "entreat," "be­ 
seech," ''recommend," "hope," "do  not doubt,"  have been  held suffi­ 
 
ehol ds  cient in wills ; all that is required is a reasonably clear expression 
s, 
of the decla rant. 135 
The Statute of Uses, 27 _Henry VIII, 1535, provided that the legal 
estate should follow the use, so that the beneficiary should thereafter 
become the legal owner.  It  read  that  wherever  one  person  "was seized 
of land to  the  use  of  another,"  in  fee  simple,  or  fee  tail,  or for life, 
or for vears, the  latter  shall  be  deemed  to  be  in  lawful, seizin, estate, 
an l possession, of such land  in  such  like  estate  as  he had  in  the  use. 
1   0   It  is to  be noted  (I)   The  Statute does  not  apply  to chattels personal. 
(2)  Nor  does  it  apply  to  leaseholds  for  years, that is where the estate 
in the tmstee is for years, since seizin applied 
111 Maitland's Equity, p. 58. 
112 Bispham, Equity, II 241, 250. 1•      
Maitland,   Equity,  pp.  53·54­ 
...  Maitland,   Equity,   pp. 55­56. 
,.. Maitland, Equity, pp. 38, 66; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (1908), 233 Ill. 327, 122 
Am·. St. R. 169, 84 N. F,. 256; Ame•, Cases, pp. 77­10;; Kenneson, Case•, pp. 16­21. 
1•       Maitland,   Equity,   35;    Kenneson,   Cues,   34,3;. 
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only to freeholds; but on the other hand if land is conveyed to A and 
his heirs to hold to the use of B for 1,000 years,' this use is executed and 
B becomes the legal owner, not of the fee, but of the term of years; but 
if B assigns it to X to the use of Y, the latter  will  have only an 
Equitable estate. (3) Again the Statute does not apply where there is an 
acti.:e trust. "I convey land unto A and his heirs, to the use that they 
shall sell the land and divide the proceeds among my children, or upon 
trust that they shall so sell and  divide.  The Stat­ ute has nothing to say 
to this case. You do not find one person seized in trust for another 
person, you find A seized upon trust to make a 
 
 
c uti ng  sale." The test seems to be, does the instrument merely tell A that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t 
B is to have the enjoyment or does it impose upon A some special duty 
in regard to the property as to manage and control it, and col­ lect and 
pay the profits to the beneficiary?; if the latter the trust is active, not 
passive, and the Statute of Uses does not thrust the legal title on the 
beneficiary. (4) Finally after Tyrrell's Case in 1557, it was held that 
the Statute exhausted itself in executing the first use, and so, in the case 
of a use upon a use, it did not execute the second use.1 7 This however 
is a matter that applies to conveyancing. 
Again no filing or recording of the  tmst  instrument  is necessary to 
make the trust valid, at least as to the parties or those  who  know or 
ought to know of its existence or terms. 138 
The trust deed in the Sugar Trust case provided that "The cus­  tody 
of the deed was to be in the president of the board, with  sole and 
independent control, and not to be shown to any  corporation, firm or 
person whatsoever except by express direction of the 
board." 139 If it is required to be put in the form of a deed, as in 
some states, then, of course, it must conform to the statutes relating 
thereto,  and ,those relating  to  registration  and  recording  such  deeds, 
in order to furnish constructive notice. But these rules are simple, 
definite and certain, and easily complied with.14° Unless the trust is to 
do business in an artificial name, or as a partnership, and there are 
statutes requiring registration, there are no other statutes except in a 
few states, affecting the creation of trusts, except those relating to 
perpetuities. These will be referred to in other connections. 
Again no fees are to be paid to the state, or other officers, except 
recording fees when the instrument is  a  deed  of  conveyance.  Of course 
if the leg­al estate in land is conveyed in trust,  the  rules  relat• ing to the 
conveyance of the legal title to the trustee, apply just the 
ur Maitland, Equity, 35­38; Tyrrell's  Case,  2  Dyer,  155a, pl.  20,  Kenneson,  Cases, 37. 
''" Carson v. Phelps, (1873), 40 Md. 73. 
1n People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., (1890), 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. R. 843, 
1  Wilgus,  Cases, 100. 
"   0  39  Cyc. 55­56. 
r 
'1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c;ame as thev apply to a conveyance of land to any other party. And in 
general vhatever rules apply  to  the  transfer  of  any  particular kind of 
property, to another person, will apply when such is to be conveyed to 
a trustee in t rust.1 41 And a promise to create  a volun­ tary trust will not 
be enforced. The rules we have been discussing apply only to the 
creation of the trust estate itself. 
It seems here again that the balance of simplicity so far as formal­ 
ities of creation are concerned is in favor of the trust. 
y 
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II. 
Parties  to  Be  Incorporated: 
, Coke's  second  requisite of  corporate  existence  was parties  to in­ 
corporate, and he indicated that these might be either natural or arti­ 
ficial. It seems now that the latter, i. e. corporations cannot, unless 
authorized  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication  be  either  an  in­ 
ti on corporator or member of another corporation.u1 General incorpor­ 
• 
ation laws  contemplate  incorporators  and  members.  The  former are 
persons, in the case of business corporations,  whose  function  it is  to  
bring  the  corporation   into  existence  under  the  statute; they 
ng may or may not themselves become members by taking stock.  When 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ri pti on  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y , 
the corporation is organized, their functions,  as  incorporators, cease.a 
2 On the other hand the members  are  those  who  become such by 
ownership of stock, and in the beginning, this ownership is acquired 
through a subscription. If  this is made after  the corpora­ tion is created, 
and capable of contracting, the ordinary rules of con­ tract may apply.m 
In most cases, however, there can be no corporation until mem­ bers 
are secured, and this must be either before or contemporan­ eously with 
the coming into existence of the corporation. This sit­ uation has 
puzzled the courts exceedingly. There are  numerous views; ( 1) Such 
a preliminary agreement has no force and effect, unless it strictly 
conforms to the statute, as signing and acknowledg­ ing the 
incorporation paper ;iu ( 2) That it is a valid  contract  from the time the 
requisite amount is subscribed, from which a party can­ not thereafter  
withdraw and which  is enforceable against the estate  of one, who dies 
before the corporation comes into existence and accepts it ;14 5 (3) That 
such a preliminary subscription is a mere withdrawable offer, revocable 
by death or insanity, at any time be­ fore the corporation comes into 
existence and accepts it expressly or 
 
 
• Continued from December issue. 
ma Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1893) 6 Wash. 134, 36 Am. St. R. 130, 1 Wilgus, 
Cases, 5s 3. Note, lb., p. 88g. 
,   ..  Nickum v. Burkhardtt,  (1897)  30 Ore. 464, 6o Am. St.  R. 822, 1 Wilgua, Cases, 391. 
1"   Southwestern  State  Co. v.  Stephens  (1909)   l;J9  Wis.  616,  131  Am.  St.  R. 1074, 
29 I,. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 120 N. W. 408. 
M< Sedalia, Warsaw etc. Co. v. Wilkerson, (1884) 83 Mo. 235, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 459; 
Coppage v. Hutton (1890) 124 Ind 401, 'l I,. R. A. 591, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 469. 
, .. Tonica & Petersburg R. R. Co.  v.  McNeeley  (1859) 21 Ill. 71, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 
491. 
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impliedly ;uc (4_) That such a subscription is a mere withdrawable 
offer to the future corporation, but a contract among the subscrib­ 
ers.1H vVhere the courts have not already passed on it, it is impos­ 
sible to tell which view they will take. Of  course if  all1 goes well, and 
the corporation is duly formed and accepts the subscriptions made, 
they will be binding, but until that time there is always great 
uncertainty from the possibility of death .or withdrawal of a sub­ 
scriber.  The difficulty  of  the courts  is  that  ''it  takes  two  to make a 
contract," and, since the corporation cannot be bound until it comes 
into existence and has proper officers to bind it, the other  party cannot 
be bound. To get around this view subscriptions are some­ times made 
with a trustee for the unborn corporation, which a court 
 
 
 
 
ver  of equity will enforce in its favor whenever the corporation comes 
into existence.14 
Parties  to  a Trust: 
This again  shows  the simpler  theory  that  underlies  the  trust. If 
, A gives  money  or  other  property  to  B, in  trust  for  C, or  even if 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
uis hed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, 
A declares that he holds money  or other  property  in  trust  for  C,­ 
C whether in existence at the time or not, whenever he comes into 
existence, at least if within the rule relating to perpetuities, can 
enforce the trust in equity. In other  words only one party or  person 
is necessary to declare a trust ; all the trustee has to do is to accept 
d it expressly or impliedly, and the beneficiary does not have to do 
that. All that is required is for the settlor to express an intent to  create 
a trust, and designate some one a trustee, and some one a beneficiary.1t 
9 
Of course this declaration of trust must be distinguished from a gift. 
If I write a letter to my son saying "I give you my Blackacre estate, my 
lease­hold house in the High Street, the sum of £1000. Consols standing 
in my name, the wine in my cellar," this does not create a trust, nor 
does it.make a valid gift for a letter will not oo to 
es , 
make such conveyances; even if I execute a deed covenanting to 
convey and assign these things, there is not yet a trust nor a perfect gift, 
and the reason is "I make it clear I do not intend to make my­ 
1'" Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt (1895) 87 Me. 234, 47 Am. St. R. 323, 1 
Wilgus, Cases 474. 
HT .Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 12 Am. St. R. 701, 
3  L.  R.  A.  796,  41  N,  W.   1026,  1  Wilgus,  Cases,  492.   Nebraska   Chickory   Co.  v.  Led· 
nicky, (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245. 
"" San Joaquin Land Co. v. West (1892) 94 Cal. 399, 29 Pac. 785, 1 Wilgus, Cases 
497; West v. Crawford (1889) So Cal. 19, 1 Wilgus, Cases 500. 
,.. Ames, Cases, note p. 213; Kenn son's Cases, p. 89,  28  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of 
Law, p. 1100. 
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self  a trustee, I mean  to give" instead, and an intention  to give, with­ 
out delivering the gift is not a gift. "The two intentions are very 
different, the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who is 
intending to make himself a trustee intends  to retain  his  rights  but to  
come  under  an  onerous  obligation."    "An   imperfect  gift  is no 
 
 
it ut e declaration  of  trust."1; o 
''Every person who can hold and dispose of any legal  or  equit­ able 
estate or interest in property, may create a trust in respect of  such estate 
or interest,''­the state, a private corporation, married women, an infant 
at least till he avoids it, and aliens and non­resi­ dents.1"1 Still further 
it is the constitutional right  under  the  Fed­ eral constitution of a citizen 
of one state to constitute a citizen of another state a trustee of his 
property real or personal, 
 
 
 
 
 
tee, wherever  the  property is located. The Indiana statute forbidding 
n this  was  declared  unconstitutiona   l.15 2 
So too any  kind  of  property  may  be held  in  trust; real, personal, 
, legal,  equitable,  in  possession  or  in  action,  (if  assignable),  in re­ 
mainder, reversion, or expectancy, domestic or foreign, can be the 
subject of a declaration of trust, subject to the rules above given.1" 3 
Any one capable of holding property, may be a trustee, an infant, 
c e 
married women, corporation, or alien, or even a person of unsound 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ion mind. And in the case of an infant or lunatic, trustee, a court of 
equity  can  vest  the  title  in  some  suitable  person  to  carry  out the 
d trust.    One  of   several   beneficiaries  may  be  a  trustee  if   the settlor 
so  appoint s.15 4 
n So too any one can be a beneficiary,­infants, married women, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it h corporations, unincorporated bodies, residents or non­residents, 
any one capable of taking and holding any kind of property and no 
, acceptance by the beneficiary is necessa ry.1 55 
The other three requisites of corporate existence named by Lord 
Coke,­name, place, and proper words, along with some others are 
provided for under general laws in the Incorporation Paper. This 
usually requires (I) the name, ( 2) the place, ( 3)  the purpose,  ( 4)  the 
capital stock, (S) the number of directors, and (6) the duration 
, .. Maitland, Equity, pp. 73, 74. 
llll 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc., 1st Ed. 13. 
m Scars, Trust Estates etc., p. 1q4; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. 
Ry. Co. (1886) 27 Fed. Rep. 146; Roby v. Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 20 N. E. 1093. 
,., 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 24, 25. Note, Ames, Cases, p. 193. 
, .. 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. ISi Ed. 16, 17; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, n IIO·II8. 
1"' 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 23;  Ames,  Cases,  pp.  215­231;  Kcnneson,  Cases, 90­97; 
Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. 15 (3d Ed.); Connecticut Riv.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Albee (1892) 64 Vt. 
571, 33 Am. St. R. 944. 
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The purpose of course of this Incorporation Paper 
is to give definite form to a particular corporation,­to make spe­ 
ng  
ng 
cific for a single corporation what is general and applicable to all 
s, orporations of that class. 
Although as we have seen no formal instrument is necessary  to 
the creation of a valid trust, yet in the cast of an express trust for 
 
er ty  
business a deed or declaration of trust is drawn up: (I) Providing 
for a name; (2) Designating trustees, and providing for their suc­ 
cession; (3) Providing  for the  raising and conveying  the trust res  or 
fund to the trustees, and defining their rights, powers and  duties  in 
reference thereto; (4) Providing for the issue of transferable 
certificates to those who are the cestuis que trust, in proportion to 
their respective beneficial interests in the property and profits; (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on. Providing for division of profits; (6) Limiting liability of trustees 
 
 
 
 
rati on and beneficiaries; (7) Fixing the duration, and providing for .disso­ 
n lution at  the termination  of  the t rust.1 67 
d 
These are so  similar  to  the  requirements  of  the  incorporation paper 
that they may be taken up in order and COJl?.pared with some detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ses  
Corporate Name: 
It was long ago said that the corporate name is a baptismal one, and 
of the very. befng of the corporate constitution. It is now universally 
required to be stated in 'the incorporation paper, although it perhaps 
could be acquired under the common law by user. When rightfully 
acquired the corporation is considered as having a fran­ chise therein, 
with the same exclusive right to its use in the incor­ porating state that 
it would have in a  trade  mark,  including  the right to enjoin its use 
by another domestic corporation. In several states particular 
provisions exist in relation to the selection and publication of the 
corporate name that must be strictly complied with. It has been held 
that a change of corporate name without au­ thority, makes the 
members liable as partners. 1 8 
 
Trnst Name: 
Jn the absence of a statute forbidding, a natural person may do 
business in his own name or in any name he pleases to assume as a 
business name, so long as it does not infringe another's right in a 
 
 
''" 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 435­440. 
111 Conyngton, Corporate Organization, p. 366. 
1" 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 816­829. 
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name  already  in  use  by  the latter.1  9 Since the trustees are natural 
persons, they may choose such name in which to carry on business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
os es  
if they so desire, or the name may be, probably should be and usually 
is designated  in  the deed  of  trust, as  for example,  a  trust  deed   in 
, which  Richard  Olney, l\foorefielJ  Storey and  William  F.  Beal are 
, trustees  (and  therefore  likely  to have  been  drawn  with  the utmost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
anc e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iding 
legal skill) provides: "49. The trusts of these presents may be col­ 
lectively designated for all purposes thereof as the Old South Build­ ing 
Trust, and the Trnstees may for the like purposes  be referred  to as the 
Trustees of the Old South Building T rust."100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
duct  Another signed by similarly distinguished lawyers, provides; 
"First. The trustees, in their collective capacity, shall be designated, so 
far as practicable, as the ".l\fassachusetts Electric  Companies," and 
under that name shall, so far as practicable, conduct 11 business and 
execute all  instruments  in  writing,  in  performance  of  their trus t."1 
1 
Some states have statutes, as has Michigan, providing that "No 
person  or   persons  shall  hereafter  carry  on  or  conduct  or transact 
ed business  in  this  state  under  any  assumed  name,  or  under  any desig­ 
nation, name, or style, corporate or otherwise, other than the real name 
or names of the individual or individuals  owning, conducting, or 
transacting, such business, unless such persons shall file in the office 
of the clerk of the county or  counties  in  which  such  person or persons 
own, conduct, or transact or intend tc own, conduct or transact sl,]ch 
business, or maintain an office or place of business, a certificate setting 
forth the name or names under which such bus­ iness owned is, or is to 
be conducted, or transacted and  the true or real full name or names of 
the person or persons owning, conduct­  ing or transacting the same, 
with the  home and  post office address  or addresses of  said  person or 
persons," 1 02   under  specified penalty 
9. for  failure. By a later  provision  this  was specifically  extended to 
partnerships, and no change in name shall be made until a new cer­ 
tificate shall be filed giving the facts, the old members remaining liable 
until this new certificate is filed.103 
This of course would apply to trustees carrying on business under an 
artificial name. And presumably, also, if the trnst is so organized 
,    ..  Sparks  v.  Dispatch  Transfer  Co.  (1891)   104  Mo.  531,  24  Am.  St.   R.  351.  Note, 
1 32   Am.  St. R. 571. Mutual   Benefit   Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cummings,  ­     Ore.  ­,     133  Pac. 
I 169, 47 L. R. A. N. s. 252. 
, .. Cor.yngton, Corporate Organization, Form 62. 
•1 1 Sears, Trust Estates, etc., p. 287. 
,.,  Public  Acts, Mich.  1907,  No. 101,  p. ·119. 
,..  Public  Acts,  Mich.  1913,  No.  164,  p. 286. 
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as to make the beneficiaries partners,  all  their  names  would  have  to be 
given. This however  should  and  can  be  avoided.  Such  state­ ments as 
the above are generally required in annual reports of cor­ porations, and 
are not more onerous than they are. 
 
Corporate Domicile: 
I have already referred to the uncertainty of the statutory provis­ ions 
relating to place or location. Where the New  Hampshire  stat­  ute 
provided that  the  incorporation  paper  should  state  the  "place in 
which its business  is to  be carried  on," and  the paper  drawn  by a 
supposedly competent attorney, stated "the places of business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aus e were Nashua in New Hampshire, and East Brookfield, in l\Iassa­ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i ng 
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chusetts," and the manufacturing business was done at East Brook­ 
field, and the corporate meetings held at Nashua,  the  l\Iassachu­ setts 
Supreme Judicial Court, held there was no corporation de  jure, de facto, 
or by estoppel, and the treasurer was individually liable 
lli ng, on a note given as the corporation's note. 10 So too corporations are 
• 
e  frequently dissolved for failure to maintain a domiciliary  office in 
the incorporating state, whether the statute so requires or not. It 
h was formerly  held  that corporate  stockholders'  meetings  coul<l not 
lawfully  be held  outside  of  the  creating  state  because  in  the very 
r 
nature of things the incorporating statute conferring such a privilege or 
franchise, is necessarily inoperative beyond such state, and out­ side of 
such state the assembled stockholders are possessed of only their 
natural powers.166 This  doctrine  is  gradually  passing  away, and in the 
absence of statutory provisions controlling, and with pro­ visions in the 
incorporation paper so authorizing, it is now reas­ onably safe to hold 
shareholders meetings outside  the  creating state.167 However there are 
so many conflicting decisions and statu­ tory provisions that it is never 
wise to advise such to be done.168 
 
Trust Domicile: 
Upon the other hand since Trustees act not under any special 
privilege or franchise from the state, but under  their common  law and 
constitutional right as citizens of one state to do business there 
, .. Montgomery v. Forbes,  (1889)  148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342, 1 \Vilgus, Cases,  594­ 1.. 
Frost, Incorporation and Org. of Corp., pp. 64, 65 (4th Ed.). 
'"" Miller v. Ewer (1847) 27 Mc. 509, 46 Am. Dec. 619, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 841. 
157 Mis90uri Lead etc, Co. v. Reinhard (1893) 114  Mo.  218,  35  Am.  St.  R.  746,  1 Wilgus, 
Cases, 844; Graham v. Boston etc. R. R.  (1886)  118  U.  S.  161,  1  Wilgus,  Cascs, 846, note p. 
847. 
ioa Machcn, Corp. § 1212. 
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or in another, there is no difficulty as to "place of business," and no 
all y  
place of business· is usually stated, further than to designate the city 
in which annual or other meetings are to be held. Here again the Trust  
is simpler.16 0 
Corporate  Purposes: 
 
 
 
ot  
Incorporation statutes frequently provide for  incorporation  "for any 
lawful pu'rpose" with certain exceptions, usually of a public service 
character. There is frequent difficulty in determining wheth­ er two or 
more purposes can be joined  in one incorporation  paper; the statutes 
in some states expressly authorize  this; in some  states the state 
officials so construe their ambiguous statutes; in bthers the statutes 
divide business into classes,  which cannot  be  joined; in still 
d other  states  only  one  purpose  or  general  object  can  be   claimed; 
e while  in  still others, the name of  the corporation  must  indicate  the 
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various purposes. This serves to indicate the confusion, and the 
difficulty encountered here.17° This is mitigated however somewhat 
by the rule that things that cannot be properly claimed are mere 
surplusage, and  can  be  rejected.  This  however  would  not  help out 
an incorporation paper where two objects are joined when only one is 
permitted, but either of which would be valid  if  standing alone. 
Perhaps the corporation would be permitted to elect,  and amend the 
paper, and thereafter carry on the one line of business elected. In any 
event the "object" clauses of ari important corpor­ ation paper requires 
special skill and care in drawing. 
 
Trust Purposes: 
There seems to be no such difficulty, or in fact no such limitations, 
applying to Trusts. They can be created to carry on any lawful business 
or businesses desired, one or many as the parties, the declar­ ants and 
the trustees provide for, unless there are express statutory limitations. 
They have been created for manufacturing, mining, lumbering, 
agriculture, transportation, mercantile, real estate, hold­ ing shares, 
disposing of patents, and numerous  other  purposes.171 And as we saw 
above "Every kind of valuable property,  both  real and personal, that 
can be assigned at  law may  be the subject­matter of a Trust.m Here 
again with  equal  attention  the  purposes  for which a Trust may be 
formed may be more certainly provided for than in similar 
incorporation papers. 
•1 See Forms, given in Sears, Cook (Corp.) and Conyngton (Corp. Organuation). 
1'° Frost,  Incorp.  and  Organ.  Corps.,  p.  19  et  seq.;  Machen,  Corps.,  ti   46­108. 
m Sears, Trust tates etc., p. a53. 
112 Perry, Trusts, 6th Ed., I 67. 
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For  instance  in  the  l\fassachusetts  Gas  Companies,  the declara­ 
e tion of  trust authorized  its trustees to engage:  ( r)  in manufacturing, 
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buying, selling and dealing in coal, oil, coke, gas and all products 
thereof: (2) in manufacturing and supplying  gas  or  electricity  or any 
other agent for light, heat, power or other purposes; (3) in ac­ quiring; 
owning, managing, exchanging, selling and dealing in the stocks, 
shares and securities of corporations, trusts or associations, engaged in 
whole or in  part  in any  business  above  mentioned,  or in owning and 
operating railways or railroads or transporting pas­ sengers, 
merchandise, mails or express matter, or in manufacturing, selling or 
repairing machines, equipments supplies or other articles used  by  
corporations,  trusts  or  associations  of  any  of  the classes 
above mentioned. * * * * (4)   in any  business  similar  in  character to 
ys 
that above mentioned which the trustees may deem expedient." and 
to acquire, hold and dispose of the stocks of such in stitutions. 1 
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Corporate Stock: 
The theory of the capital stock of a corporation  is that  the power to 
have such, or increase or decrease it,  is a  corporate  franchise,  and 
must be expressly conferred by the state, or otherwise it does not exist.1 
74 Incorporation statutes frequently fix maximum and mini­ mum 
limits, and sometimes limit indebtedness to the amount of capi­ tal 
stock, also special provisions are almost always made in reference to 
increase or decrease of the same, otherwise  unanimous  consent  of 
shareholders, as well as the consent of the state would be neces­ 
sarym. Under  all  the  incorporation  laws,  the  incorporation   paper 
must state the number of  shares, and  the par value  thereof  ( except 
, 
now   in   New   York)   and   these  cannot   be  changed   except   by an 
amendment made to  the articles  of  incorporation.  In  the  absence of 
statutory provisions preventing, in the  original  organization  of the 
company, preferred and common stock may be provided for in  the 
incorporation paper, but not so afterward except by uanimous consent, 
unless there are statutory provisions making other regula­ tions.176  In  
several states as in  Michigan  the statutes  provide  for a certain kind 
of redeemable pref erred stock with a limited dividend; in such states 
other kinds of preferred stock, or with greater divi­ dends cannot  be 
provided  for.   In some  states  the statute.  because 
171 Sears, Trust Estates, p. 303. 
"'Cooke v. Marshall (1899) 191 Pa. St. 315, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 761. 
m  Railway  Co.  v.  Allerton   (1873)   85   U.   S.   (18 Wall.)  233, Wilgus,  Cases, 442, 
note 763. 
m Keht v. Quicksilver Mining Co. (1879) 78 N. Y. 159, I Wilgus, Cases, 790, note 
793; Campbell v. Zylonite Co. 121 N. Y. 455. 
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orati on  the common law was otherwise, expressly provides "that each share­ 
holder  shall  be entitled  to one vote  for each  share  held."  In  such  a 
state can non­voting preferred  shares be created?  This  is answer­ ed  
differently  in  different  jurisdictions.177 In  some  states  there  is a 
statutory liability attaching to the ownership of stock, and our Supreme 
Court has just held that when a corporation organized in 
 
at ed  one state having no such statutory liability, is expressly authorized 
to do business in a state having such liability the shareholders be­ come 
liable thereon for business done in such state.178 This makes stock 
holding in corporations organized to do  business  throughout the 
United States a precarious matter. 
Trust Stock: 
s How is it with Express Trusts? Can they be created with a cap­ 
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ital stock represented by transferable shares? Or can the  property  held 
in trust by the trustees be represented by shares issued by the trustees, 
transferable, so as to give purchasers the same rights as original 
beneficiaries? 
There is no doubt now, but that at Common Law, under merely their 
power to .contract, individuals may between themselves engage in 
business together, each contributing property thereto, and take 
certificates representing their interests, which they may if the agree­ 
ment so provides transfer to others. For 100 years or so, 1720 to 
1825, the English  Bubble Act forbade this, but this was repealed  in 
England, and was never, or if at  all, only  to  a  very  limited  extent in 
force in  this  country.  The  courts  in  this  country  have  held from 
the beginning that this could be done,170 and now hold, that although by 
constitutional provisions "corporations can be created only under 
general laws" and corporation is defined in the constitu­ tion to "include 
all associations and joint stock  companies  having any of the powers 
and privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or 
partnerships," and there is no statute authorizing the creation of joint 
stock companies with  transferable  shares,  still,  such institutions can 
be created by contract among individuals under the exercise of their 
common law rights and not be  corporations. Such was the holding in a 
well considered Idaho case,  following many similar decisions in other 
states.1 80 There is therefore no law against  doing this.   Still  further  we  
have  already  seen  that  the in­ 
ll1 State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 892; Colonial Printing  etc.  Co.  v.  Duns• 
muir, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 679. 
171 Thomas v. Matthiessen (1913) 232 U. S. 221. 
1" 1 Wilgus, Cases, note p. 175. Sears, Trust Estates, fl 52­54, 
190 Spottswood v. Morris (1906) 12 Id. 360, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665, 85 Pac. 1094. 
ng  
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terest of a beneficiary is substantially a property right inheritable, 
descendible,  and  transferable  as  other  rights  are.   The 9th section 
al  
of  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds  required  an  assignment  to  be in 
writing; and since the beneficiaries' rights are not those of joint or co­
tenants  in the trust fund, but  wholly  incorporeal   and intangible, 
t  just what the trust declared provides, the most natural way to rep­ 
resent them is by a certificate, and the most natural and convenient way 
of transfer is by an assignment of the certificate. In Estate of 
y 
Oliver, the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court,  held  that  the  interest of 
the stockholder  "was  an  interest  in  the profits made. He had no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ons  title to the land bought by the trustees for the company, as a tenant 
in common or otherwise and could neither  convey  nor  encumber  it. His 
interest in it was personal estate  and ­the  extent  of  that  interest was 
shown by his cerificate of stock." 181 
The following are illustrations of the stock provisions in a few 
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Trusts:­ 
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"Central Massachusetts Light and Power Co. The beneficial in­ 
terest in the trust created by its agreement  and declaration  of  trust  is 
divided into 6,500 preferred shares and 6,500  common  shares. The  
latter  have  no  par  value.    The   former  have  a  par  value of 
$100, are entitled to cumulative preferred dividends of  5 per  cent  the  
first  year  and  increasing  thereafter  yearly  to  6  per  cent after 
 
 
 
 
 
 
es t  May 15, 1918. The preferred shares have a preference in liquida­ 
tion and are entitled to $1JO if the trust is terminated within  two 
years, and to amounts increasing thereafter yearly up to $125 if the 
on termination occurs after May 15, 1918."182 
e 
The Worcester Railways and Investment Company issued "nego­ 
tiable certificates or evidences of interest for 60,000 shares, each 
share representing a fractional  beneficial  interest of  1/6oooo  in" 
ue its property,  the trustees having discretion  to fix the dividends there­ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
issi on, 
on.1ss 
The capital of the Massachusetts Light and Traction Companies, 
is "divided into 100,000 shares of the par value of $1.00 each, 
bearing 5 per cent. non­cumulative dividends, to be designated as 
"preferred A stock," 50,000 shares of the par value of $5.00 each, 
bearing 6 per cent. non­cumulative dividends, to be designated "pre­ 
ferred B stock," and 10,000 shares of the par value of $25,000, of 
common stock."184 
 
 
181 Oliver's Estate (1890) 136 Pa. 43, zo Am. St. R. 894. 
181 Report (No. 1788 House) of Special Commission, Mass., on Voluntary Associa· 
tions (1913) p. 40. 
111 lb. p. zo. 
'"lb. p. 44­ 
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It would seem again here that the Express Trust is much more fltxible 
than the usual corporation provisions are in reference to shares, there 
being no state to interfere, or statute to follow, anri the 
· whole matter can be moulded to suit the parties, and may be changed 
in any way or at any time, in accordance ·with such provisions as may 
be inserted in the trust agreement. The only  point of  difficulty  here is 
in reference to partnership liability, a matter which is considered later 
on. 
s Corporate Directors: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ti ngs  
Statutes usually require the number to be stated, and when once fixed 
can be changed only by an amendment regularly adopted. Statutes also 
usually require them  to be shareholders  to  the  extent of a few shares. 
Being elected there is no power of removal, unless expressly provided 
for in the statute, incorporation paper,  or  by­ laws. By perhaps all 
business corporation statutes there mmt be directors, and in them the 
ordinary powers of the corporation are vested. 1 86 They however have 
no legal or equitable title to tne cor­ 
, porate  property. They act  only  in  duly called  meetings. 187 Their 
functions are sui generis, and have been likened to those of agents, 
trustees or mandatories of the corporation, but perhaps they are strictly 
neither. 188 Directors, however, are not agents of the share­ holders, and 
except in certain peculiar situations are not  generally said to be in a 
position of trust toward them.1 89 Courts are not  in accord upon the 
degree of care and diligence required of directors, one line of 
authorities saying that the care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent 
man takes of  his  own  business,  is  required, while another line of 
authorities says, since they get no pay,  no greater care is  required  than  
that  required  of  a  gratuitous bailee.19 0 
c 
They have no authority  to sell or  dispose of  the corporate  capital or 
property, except such as is properly done in the ordinary course of 
business. For   defaults  of   the  directors   affecting  all   the  share­ 
s holders alike,  they are  primarily  liable only  to the corporation,  and 
1••      In   the   Matter  of  Election  of  Directors,  63  N.  J.  L.  168,  2    \Vilgus,  Cases,  p.  1744, 
'"" Blood  v.  La  Serena,  113 Cal.  221;  Metropolitan  Elev.  R.  R. Co.  v.  Manhattan El. 
Ry. Co. (1884) 11 Daly (N. Y.) 373, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 694, note 702. 
'"' Bank of Little Rock v. McCarthy ( 1892) 55 Ark. 473, 29  Am.  St.  R. 6o,  1  Wilgus, 
Cases, note 850. 
, .. Allen  v.  Curtis  (1857)  26 Conn. 456, 2  Wilgus,  Cases, 1727;  Ellis v. Ward  (18go)  
137 Ill. 509, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1729; Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank (1891) 89 Tenn. 630, 
24 Am. St. R. 625, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1731. 
>•• See "Purchase of  Shares of  Corporation  by  a  Director  from  a  Shareholder," by 
H. L. Wilgus, 8 Mich. Law Rev. (Feby. 1910) p. 267. 
1'° North  Hudson  Building  &  Loan   Assn.  v.  Childs  (1892)  82  Wis.  46o,  33  Am.   St. 
R. 57, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1737.  Sec also 2 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1874­1888. 
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only when they so control the corporation as to prevent it from bringing 
a proper action to protect itself amounting to a substantial breach of 
trust, can the shareholder bring a representative suit in equity to prevent 
a failure of justice. Courts of equity have no 
 
 
 
 
 
ent  special jurisdiction over directors merely as such. It is only when 
rs there is a breach of trust upon their part, that they can be called to 
account  in equit y.191 
Trustees  of   Trusts: 
In case of the Trust, the Trustees stand, so far as control and 
management  are  concerned,  if   the  Trust  agreement  so  provides,  in a 
position somewhat analogous to that of directors in a  corporation. They,  
however,  exercise  control,  because  they  are   the  owners  of the property, 
and not the agents of the  beneficiaries,  or  of  any  one else. They  act  as  
owners,  but  as owners  that  are  obliged  to  render an account in equity 
not merely to all the beneficiaries as a whole, 
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but to each and every beneficiary; for the beneficiary's right is in­ 
dividual, and in  personam,  and  enforceable  in  equity  primarily, not 
secondarily, against the trustee.1 92 
A trustee has whatever estate either legal or equitable is neces­  sary 
for him fully to carry  out  the  trust created  but  no further ;1 93 and (1) 
"A trustee is bound to do anything that he is expressly bid­ den to do 
by the instrument creating the trust. (2) A trustee may safely do 
anything that he is expressly authorized to do by that in­ strument, even 
loan or invest money without adequate security. 
(3) A trustee is bound to refrain from doing anything that is ex­ pressly 
forbidden by that instrument. (4) Within  these  limits  a trustee must 
play the  part  of  a  prudent owner  and a  prudent  man of business," 
not as if he had himself  alone  to consider,  but  also "for the benefit of 
other people for ,vhom he felt morally bound to provide."19 
Upon the other hand, however, just because the trustee is owner 
6. 
of the property, if the trustee dies intestate his estate devolves upon his 
heir or personal representative if he had a fee; so also he can devise the 
estate, or convey it inter vivos;19 in fact "At  law  the  trustee has all 
those powers of alienating inter ·vi·vos, mortgaging and 
1111  Dodge  v.  Woolsey   (1855)   59  U.  S.  (18   How.)  331,  1  Wilgus,  Cases,  88;  Hawes 
v. Oakland (1881) 104 U. S. 450, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1716. 
111 Ames, Cases, pp. 235­278. 
,... Reichert v. Missouri & Ill. Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R 307, 83 
N. E. 166. 
'" Maitland, Equity, p. 98; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, I 127; Whiteley v. Learoyd, 
33 Ch. D. 355, 12 A. C. 722, 25 Eng. Ru!. Cas. 326. 
191 Maitland, Equity, pp. 86-go. 
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so forth that he would  have  were  there  no trust  in existence,"  but of 
course any heir, devisee, executor, administrator or party taking with 
notice is Loun<l by the trust. To prevent these results several trustees 
arc appointed to hold as  joint­tenants,  with  its  attendant surv 
iYorship.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tes  
Unlike directors the act of a majority of trustees does not bind the 
minority., all must join in a conveyance, or· in a  receipt.  They are not 
at all agents for one another, nor can one shelter himself  by saying he 
was out voted, if he, nevertheless, acquiesced in the action  taken.197          
Of   course,  however  all  of   these  matters  can  be modified to suit 
the wishes of the settlor. 
The following from the declaration of trust of the l\fassachusetts Gas 
Companies,­a manufacturing tmst,­indicates what may be 
m done :10 8 
e  "The trustees shall hold the legal title to all property at any time 
belonging to this trust, and subject only to the specific limitations 
, 
herein contained, they shall have the absolute control of the conduct 
of  all  business  of  the trust; and  the  following  enumeration  of spe­ 
e cific d,1ties and  powers shall  not  be construed  in anyway  as a limi­ 
 
 
 
ons  tation upon the general powers intended to be conferred upon them. 
"The Trustees shall have authority to adopt and use a common 
ti on seal ; to make all such contracts as they may deem expedient in the 
rwis e;  
conduct of business of the trust; from time to time to release, sell, 
exchange. or otherwise dispose of, at public or private sale, any or 
m all  of  the  trust  property,  whether  real or  personal,  for  such prices 
either in cash or the stocks, shares, or securities of other corpora­ tions. 
trusts or a sociations and upon such terms as to credit or oth­ erwise as 
they may deem expedient; to guarantee or assume the ob­ ligations of 
other corporations, trusts or associations  and  to  enter into such 
agreements by way of indemnity or otherwise as they may deem 
expedient in connection with the acquisition of property from the 
subscribers as  hereinbefore  provided  or  otherwise;  to  confer, by way 
of substitution, such power and authority on the President, Treasurer, 
Secretary, and Executive Committee, and other  officers and agents 
appointed by them, as they may deem expedient; to bor­ row money for 
the purposes of the trust and give the obligations  of the Trustees  
therefor;  to  loan any  money  from  time  to time in  the 
11 Maitland, Equity, p. 93. 
••• Reichert v. Missouri etc. Coal Co. (1907)  231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83 
N. E. 166; :Mattison v. Mattison (1909) 53 Ore. 254, 100  Pac.  4,  133  Am.  St,  R. 8:z9; Adams' 
Estate (1908) :z21 Pa. 77, 7a At!. 438, 128  Am. St. R. 7:z7, Estate of  Fesmire, 134  Pa. St. 67, 
19 Am. St. 676. 
''" Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 303. 
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hands of the Trustees, with or without security, on such terms as 
e they may deem expedient; to subscribe  for, acquire, own, sell or oth­ 
erwise dispose of such real or personal property including the stocks, 
shares, and securities of any other corporations, trusts, or associa­ tions, 
as they may deem expedient in connection with the purposes of the 
trust; to vote in person or by  proxy  on  all shares  of  stock  at any time 
held by them, and to collect and receive the income, interest, and profits 
of any such stock or securities; to collect, sue for, re­ ceive, and receipt 
for all sums of money at any time becoming due 
s to said trust; to employ counsel and to begin, prosecute, defend, and 
settle suits at law, in equity or otherwise, and to compromise or  re­ fer 
to arbitration any claims in favor of or against the trust; and in general 
to do all such matters and things as in their judgment will promote or 
advance the business which they are authorized to carry on, although 
such matters and things may be neither specifically authorized nor 
incidental to any matters or things specifically author­ ized.   In 
addition  to  the  powers  herein  granted  the Trustees  shall 
 
 
ees  have all power with reference to the conduct of the business and 
management of the property of the trust which are possessed by 
ser  
directors of a manufacturing corporation under the laws of l\Iassa­ 
chusetts. 
"So far as strangers to the trust are concerned a resolution of the 
Trustees authorizing a particular act to be done shall be conclusive 
evidence  in  favor  of   strangers  that  such  act  is  within  the power 
y of   the  Trustees;  and   no  purchaser   from   the  Trustees   sh.all be 
bound to see to the application of the purchase money or other con­ 
sideration paid or delivered by or for said purchaser to or from the 
Trustees. 
"Stated meetings of the Trustees shall be held at least once a 
month, and other meetings shall be held from time to time upon the 
call of the President or any  three of  the  Trustees.  A  majority of 
the Trustees shall constitute a quorum;  and  the concurrence of  all 
the Trustees shall not be necessary to the validity  of any actioQ 
taken by them, but the decision expressed by a vote of a majority of 
the Trustees present and voting at any meeting shall be conclusive." 
Other provisions authorize the adoption of by­laws, election of 
officers, and executive committee, and agents, accepting resignations, 
removing officers, filling vacancies, keeping records, etc. 
Also "The Trustees shall not be liable for  any  error of  judgment or  
for  any loss arising out of  any act or omission  in the execution  of 
this trust, so long as they act in good faith, nor shall they be per­ sonally 
liable for the acts or omissions of each other, or for  the acts or 
omissions of any officer, agent, or servant elected or appointed by 
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or acting for them ; and they shall not be obliged to give any bond to 
secure the due performance of this trust by them. 
"Any Trustee may acquire, o,vn, and dispose of shares in this trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ses, to the same  extent  as  if  he were  not a Trustee." 
 
Corporate  Life  or Duration: 
\Ve have seen that corporations were often said ,to be immortal. 
 
 
 
 
 
wal  This of course meant that there was continuous or perpetual suc­ 
cession  for an indefinite and  unlimited  time  unless  the corporation 
e was  dissolved  in  some  of  the  ways  known  to  the law,­loss  of all 
members, act of Parliament, surrender of franchises, or quo  war­ 
ranto for  misuser  or non­user. 10 This  is still  the law,  unless there 
n, are  constitutional or  statutory  provisions  to  the contrary,  but there 
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ent  
are such in nearly ever state, the limit  fixed  being  usually  from  20 to 
50 years, and in many cases the proposed duration must  be stated in 
the Incorporation Paper. In  many  states a  renewal  may  be had for a 
like period. With us the Legislature has no right to dissolve unless the 
power to do so is reserved to  the  State.200  However, through quo 
warranto proceedings  for  violation  of  duty  injurious­ ly affecting the 
public, the courts may pronounce judgment of dis­ solution.201 During 
the whole of  its prescribed  life, the corporation is said to have 
perpetual or continuous succession, and remains the same corporation 
regardless of any change in membership. 
 
Trust Duration: 
In this respect, because of the "rule against perpetuities," the 
corporate organization seems simpler than  the  Trust  form.  This  rule 
in all its applications is exceedingly intricate and technical, and 
frequently papers, especially wills, drawn by the best lawyers have 
contained provisions that have been rendered ineffective because 
offending against the rule. In the matter of  an  ordinary  business trust, 
however, while perhaps a perpetual or immortal existence can­ not be 
acquired, an existence that is as long as or  in  many  cases much longer 
than the ordinary corporate life can be obtained. 
The English rule seems to have two branches, one relating to the 
vesting of future estates, and the other to trusts for accumulations. 
These may be stated: (1) "Every future contingent estate limited 
 
 
''" State v. Payne  (1895)  129  Mo.  468,  I  \Vilgus,  Cases,  830;  Hoston  Glass  Manulac• 
tory v. Langdon (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass.) 49, 35 Am. Dec. 292, I \Vilgus, Cases, 866. 
200 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, I 
\Vilgi,s, Cases, 708. 
0•0 People v. Dashaway Association (1890) 84 Cal. 114, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1298. 
J ' ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
er  to arise on an event  that might  possibly  happen  later  than  21  years 
and  the  period   of   gestation   af1ter   the   death   of   persons   living  at 
the creation of ­the estate is void the day  it  is  created.'' 202  (  2) "vVhere 
property, real and personal,  is given  to  trustees  to  hold  and to receive 
and invest the  rents  and  profits  of  the  real  property  and the income of 
the personal property, and to deliver the property and income at a certain 
or contingent future time to the beneficiaries, if 
al  that time may possibly happen more than 21  years and the period of 
 
t her  
gestation after the death of persons living at the creation of the trust, 
the direction to accumulate and the gift of the accumulated fund are 
void absolutely." 203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ral  Neither of these rules \­vould seem to prevent the creation of trusts 
for indefinite periods, as A grants property to  B in  fee  to  control and 
manage for  C in  fee,  for  each  estate,  the legal and  equitable, is 
vested in the respective parties, and they together  may at any time if 
they choose terminate the trust, and together convey an absolute title to 
the property.20 
A recent writer however has said "The  courts  in  this  country seem 
to be moving very rapidly toward the general announcement of the rule 
that trusts of absolute indestructible equitable interests can­ not be 
made to last for longer than lives in being and twenty one years, and 
that any provision which may by any possibility postpone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i ng the term of the trusteeship for longer than that period is wholly void 
from the beginning." 20 
It has been held in Illinois that where the trustees have the abso­ lute 
power to sell at any time free of the rights of the beneficiaries,  the rule 
does not apply ;206 and likewise in Massachusetts, if the in­ come is not 
to be accumulated, but distributed as it accrues,  and where the whole 
equitable interest is at every moment vested abso­ lutely in the 
shareholders, and can be sold by them at any time, the rule does not 
apply ;207 but if the trustees and beneficiaries cannot together convey 
the complete title without violating the  trust,  the rule is violated. 208 
In  New  York  the statute provides  that "Every  future estate shall 
be void in its creation which shall suspend the absolute power of 
alienation  for  a longer  period  than  two lives in  being. * * * Such 
,., Rood, History of Real  Property Law, I 27. 
203  18  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  (1st  Ed)    pp. 381­382. 
,.. Gray, J. C., Ruic against Perpetuities, 2d Ed.  (1906)  I 236. 
"'"Kales, Transfer of Title to Real Estate,  I 72. 
""Hart v. Seymour (1893) 147 Ill. 598. 
201 Howe v. Morse (1899) 174 Mass. 491, S5 N. E. 213. 
""Winsor v. Milli (1892), 157 Mass. 362; Young v. Snow (1897) 167 Mass. 287. 
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power of alienation is suspended when there  are  no  persons  m being 
by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." Under this 
statute it has been held that if the  trust  term  is longer  than the period 
of two lives in being, but the trustees have at all 
· times the power to convey the complete title neither the rule nor statute 
is violated.209 And where the trust  is for  the sole benefit  of  the settlors 
or their appointees, the rule does not apply, even though the 
beneficiaries are infants, or  are  numerous, and  the entire inter­ est 
cannot be disposed of without their consent.210 
In New York, lV[ichigan and Minnesota, the period seems to be 
er  two lives only; in Wisconsin, two lives and 20 years; in California, 
 
 
 
 
 
ent  Idaho, North and South Dakota, the period is fixed by lives, in 
 
 
 
 
ies  being at the creation, but there is no limitation as to number; in all 
e other states the period is a "life or lives in being and 21 years there­ 
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;  
after."211 The lives specified may be those of trustees, existing 
beneficiaries or strangers.212 
The following are illu trations: The term of the Boston and Wor­ 
cester Electric Companies is "twenty years after the  death  of  the 
last· survivor of 27 persons named in the agreement and declara­ 
tion."213 In the Massachusetts Electric  Companies  "The· trust  is 
to continue for the term of 21  years  from  the  date  of  the  agree­ 
ment, unless the holders of at least two thirds of the shares then 
outstanding shall at a meeting called for that purpose vote for its ' 
termination or continuance."214 The Massachusetts Northern Rail­ 
ways put it: "The trust·is to continue for the term  of  twenty  years 
after the death of the last survivor of ten persons"  named,  six  of 
whom were the sons and daughters of the other four, three of whom 
were trustees; but at any time by a vote of 2/3 of  the outstanding 
shares in a meeting called for the purpose, confirmed  by  the vote of 
5/7 of the trustees, the trust can be terminated, and the property be 
distributed, or be sold and proceeds distributed. 21 
As has been pointed out a succession of  trustees  can  be kept  up by 
means of  joint  tenancies, or by provisions  in  the trust­deed,  or  if 
necessary to prevent failure by appointment of a court of equity, 
 
 
""'Robert v. Corning (1882) 8g N. Y. 225; Henderson v. Henderson (1889) 113 
N. Y. 1. 
21•Beardsley  v.   Hotchkiss  (1884)   96  N.  Y.  201;  N.  Y.   ife  Ins.  Co.  v. Livingston 
(1892)  133 N.  Y.  125;  Hope  v.  Brewer  (1892)  136 N.  Y.  126;  Holmes  v.  Walter (1903) 
u8 Wis. 409; Williams v. Montgomery (1896) 148 N. Y. 519. 
211 Sears, Trust Estates etc., pp. 137­138. 
212 Crooke v. King's County ( 1884) 97 N. Y. 421; Bailey v. Bailey (1884) 97 N. Y. 
460. 
m Report  of   Special  Com ittee  of   Mass.   House   Reps.  No.  1788,   p.  7.  
"• lb. p. 8. 
Ill lb. p. 15. 
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for it is a maxim that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.216 
t So too if  there is not a special confidence  in the person, instead of in 
 
 
orati on  the office, of the trustee, no additional conveyances are necessary 
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to keep up the succession of powers, rights and duties in the trustees.21 
A little care in the drawing up the  trust  instrument  may  make  the 
trust as convenient in this regard as the corporation. 218 
This brings us to a consideration of the corporation and trust 
obligations and liabilities. Here are important differences, in theory, 
and great care is necessary in drawing trust agreements or there is 
danger of unexpected or unusual liabilities. 
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Corporation Liabilities. 
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It results, of course, that because a corporation  is a  separate 
person in the law, that its rights and obligations are its own, and not 
those  of  any other persons. And this doctrine obtains universally 
except when this corporate personality is used to "defeat public 
convenience,  justify  wrong,   protect   fraud,   or defend  crime."210 It 
follows of course that if the corporation is properly organized, and the 
shareholders and officers do all they should do, and do nothing they 
should not do,  no one is liable except the corporation for any 
obligations incurred. The theory is that  the creditor must look to the 
capital ,ttock of the corporation for his protection; and this capital 
stock is frequently called a "trust fund" for the protec­ tion  of 
creditors. 220 Yet this trust fund doctrine has been bitterly 
assailed, and it is held there is no liability on officers and share­ 
), holders,   in  the  absence  of   statutory   provisions,   unless   there is 
actual or constructive fraud, or ultra vires, or tortious or illegal acts 
upon  their  par t. 21 Of  course  it  is  agreed  that  if  there  is  a trust 
7;  fund,  it  is  peculiar,  unlike  ordinary  trust  funds,  since  there  is no 
0•1      Reichert  v.  Mission  etc.  Coal  Co.  (1907)  231 111.  238,  121  Am.  St.  R.  307; Dodge 
v.  Dodge  (1908)   109  Md.   164,   71  Atl.   519,   r30   Am.   St.    R.  503,   note  508;  Smith v. 
Davis  (1891)  90  Cal.  25,  25  Am.  St.   R.  92;   U.   S.  Casualty  Co.  v.  Kaccr   (1902) 169 
Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 92 Am. St. R. 641. 
211 Kadis  v.  Weil  (r9r3)  r64 N.  C. 84,  80  S.  E.  229.  Compare  Maryland  Casualty 
Co. v. Safe Deposit Co. (r91I) rr5 Md. 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 1279, note. 
218 See Jiorms given in Scars, Cook (Corp. 7th Ed.), Conyngton (Corp. Organ.). 
2U Smith v. Moore (1912) 199 Fed. 689. Sec also 10 Mich. Law Rev. 310; 12 Col. 
Law Rev. 496. 
""'Wood  v. Dummer  (1824)  3  Mason  308,  2   Wilgus,  Cases,  1847;  Scovill  v. Thayer 
(1881)  105  U.  S.  143,  2  Wilgus,  Cases,  1907;  Shields  v.  Hobart  (1903)  172  Mo.   491,  95 
Am. St. R. 529, 72 S. W. 669­ 
221 O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer (1894)  106 Ala. 205, 54  Am.  St.   R.  31,  2   Wilgus, Cases, 
1852; Hospes v. Northwestern  Mfg.  Co.  (1892)   4,8  Minn.  174,  2  Wilgus,   Cases, 1911; Hall v. 
Henderson (1900) 134 Ala. 455, 63 L. R. A. 673. 
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separation of' the legal and equitable titles, and no special trusts and 
confidence existing between the corporation, corporate officers, or 
shareholders, and corporate creditors. The corporation owns  the whole 
title iegal and equitable to corporate property and the creditor 
 
 
cti on. has, merely as shch, no lien upon it either at law or in equity, at 
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least before insolvency. 222 And so it is held by the great weight of 
authority ( in the absence of bankruptcy laws forbidding) that a 
corporation can lawfully prefer its creditors, even stockholder and 
director creditors, if it chooses, and there is no actual fraud.228 
Nevertheless it is to a fund designated  capital,  or capital stock, and  
to that only,  that  creditors can _look  for  protection. There is 
however much confusion as to exactly  what  is  included in  this 
fund. It perhaps can now be safely said to include all the corporate 
property, real, and personal, tangible and intangible, choses in 
possession and in action, up to an amount equal to the face value of 
the outstanding stock, but yet not to that extent, if the corporate 
capital has been dissipated by misfortune, and not by fault of re­ 
sponsible  partiesm. 
There is however yet some uncertainty as to holding shareholders 
liable for unpaid stock, or for stock issued for overvalued  property,  or 
for dividends paid out of corporate capital. 
New York has just held that under the law of that state share­ holders 
in the absence of an agreement to pay  up their  stock,  can­ not be held 
by creditors to pay up. 226 As to payment of stock by property, one line 
of authorities holds that in the absence of actual fraud, established by 
the complainant, the judgment  of  the  direc­ tors is final,226 as where 
the three dummy incorporators and direc­ 
s, tors  holding $3,000 of  stock  in  the U.  S. Steel  Corporation,  under 
the  New Jersey law passed  a  resolution  that  the property  proposed 
))   to be turned over to the company was equal in value  to the  face value 
of the stock and bonds, $1,410,000,000  to  be  issued  for  it. The 
Government experts however think there  was  $700,000,000 water in 
it.  Another  view  is  that  it is only  a  quegtion  of  fact  to be determined 
by a jury when the question is  submitted  to  them upon  the  facts  put  
before  them,  and  good   faith   will  not protect; 
m Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co. (18g3) 150 U. S. 371, 2 Wilgus, Caaes, 1868. 
:21 Catlin  v. Eagle  Bank  (1826)  6  Conn.  233, 2 Wilgus,  Cases,  1815;  Corey  v.  Wads• 
worth  (1897)   118  Ala.  488,  2   Wilgus,  Cases,  1836.    Compare  Rouse  v.  Merchants   Natl. 
Bank  (1889)  46 0.  S.  493,  15  Am.  St.  R.  644,  2  Wilgus,  Cases,  1819;  Olney  v. Conanicut 
Land Co. (1889) 16 R. I. 597, 27 Am. St. R. 767, :a Wilgus, Cases, 1832. 
224 Am. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson (1913)) 66 Ore.. 417, 134 Pac. 1029; In 
re Wells Estate (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174. 
m Southworth v. Morgan (1912) 205 N. Y. 293. 
::.­. Graves v. Brooks (1898) 117 Mich. 424, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1950. 
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al  
­  so­ 
another  rule  is  that  a  large  difference  in  the  actual  value  of  the 
se property  and  the  face value of  the stock  issued  is  prima  facie evi­ 
tors  
dence of fraud and calls for explanation ; 21 and still another view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
red  
is that if the corporation is a "going concern," but nearly "gone," 
stock may be issued at a discount to takers in order to see, if per­ 
chance, it may be revived, at the expense of subsequent creditors.228 
So, too, while it was originally held that the directors could not pay 
dividends to shareholders out of the corporate capital, yet our Su­ 
se preme Court has held that where shareholders receive such dividends 
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in good faith, supposing they were properly declared and paid out of 
profits instead of capital they may keep  them,229  and  the creditor must 
whistle through the corporate whistle to the defaulting direc­ tors to 
make good their loss. 
Then too there are statutory  efforts  to  protect  creditors,  which for 
the most part are satisfactory to nobody. These are attempts 
rs 
to make officers and  stockholders  liable  for  corporate  debts  under 
such varying circumstances that it is difficult to tell what the liability 
is, whether penal or contractual ,230 primary or secondary,231, limited or 
unlimited, separate or joint, or on prior, existing, or subsequent 
shareholders,m  and  whether  enforceable  outside  of  the  state  or no 
t.234     So too many states provide that all "fictitious  issues of stock 
, or bonds shall be void," yet courts have had great difficulty  in giving 
7, effect  to  such  provisions,  for   if   the  effort  to  issue  stock  at  a  dis­ 
count is z,oid, the statute would then hurt creditors more than in any 
other way, and defeat its own probable purpose. 235  On  the other  hand  
Montana has a statute that provides  that  stock  may  be issued 
. for  mining  property  taken  at  any  value,  and  such  stock  shall  be 
 
 
 
 
us, deemed to be wholly paid up. 236 
 
 
m See cases cited in State Trust Co. v. Turner (1900) 111 Ia. 664, 82 N. W. 1029, 53 
L. R. A. 136, 2 Wilgus, Cases. 1953. Compare I Cook, Corp., H 46­47. 
'""'Handley v. Stutz (1891) 139 U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923. 
221 McDonald v. Williams (1899) 174 U. S. 397, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1981. 
:a  Wiles  v.  Suydam   ( 1876)  64  N.  Y.  173,  2  Wilgus,  Cases, 1981. 
m Umsted  v.  Buskirk  (1866)  17 0.  S.  u3,   2  Wilgus,  Cases,  1990• 
.., Hanson v. Donkersley (1877) 37 Mich. 184, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1997. 
..,  Harger  v.  McCullough   (1846)  2  Denio  (N.   Y.)   19,  2   Wilgus.  Cases,  1998; Dank 
of   Poughkeepsie   v.   Ibbotson   (1840)   24  Wend.   (N.   Y.)   473,   2   Wilgus,   Cases, 2001; 
Foot  v.  Sinnoclc  (1887)   120  Ill.  350,  2  Wilgus,  Cases,  2003;   Zang  v.  Wyant   (1898)   25 
Colo. 551, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2005. 
234  Marshall   v.   Sherman   (1895)   148  N.  Y.  9,   2    Wilgus,   Cases,  2021;   Howarth v. 
Angle  (1900)  162  N.  Y.  179,  2  Wilgus,  Cases,  2028;  Whitman  v.  Oxford  Bank (1900) 
176 U. S. 559, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2018. 
Van Cleve v. Berkey (1898) 143 Mo. 109, 42 L. R. A. 593, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1953. 
Compare I  Cook, Corp., § 47. 
•• Civil Code of Montana, § 3824, (Mar. 7, 1895). 
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Tmst Liabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nall y  (a) Trustees liability: As has been pointed out, in a Trust, the 
tru5tees are the owners of the property to the extent of any estate 
necessary for them to have under the instrument of trust to enable them 
fully to execute it. If it therefore gives to them full control, 
management,  and  disposition  of  the  property,  they  acts  as owners 
do, as principals and not as agents of others. 237 It  would naturally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is e;  
follow from this that they bind themselves personally and themselves 
alone, in the absence of some provision to the contrary. The debts 
 
 
ee. they incur are their personal debts, not those of the beneficiaries, 
nor of  the trust  fund.238 
As  was  said  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  Taylor v. 
Dm•is,239     ''\Vhen  an  agent  contracts  in  the  name  of   his  principal, 
s the principal  contracts and  is bound,  but  the agent  is not.   \Vhen  a 
 
 
 
 
ured trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound for 
he has no principal.  The  trust  estate cannot  promise;  the  contract 
is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trustee 
all y  
holds  the  estate,  although   only  v,·ith  the  power  and  for  the purpose 
of managing it, he is personally bound by the contracts he makes as 
trustee,  e\'en  when  designating  himself   as  such.  *  * * Of course 
when a trustee acts in good faith for the benefit of the trust he is entitled 
to indemnity himself for  his engagements out  of  the estate in his 
hands." As for  instance  where a broker  secured  a loan  for  the  trustee  
for  the  benefit  of   the  estate,  the  trustee  promising to 
e  pay the commission out of the trust fund, it was held that the trust estate 
was not liable, but the  trustee  was  personally.2  0  And  so where a note 
signed  by  A. B. Trustee,  was taken  by  the payee with 
. knowledge  that  it  was  for  the benefit  of  the estate, yet  the trustee 
;  was held personally  liable.20  Hill  on  Trustees  states  the  rule  "A trnstee 
who carries on any  trade  with  the  trust  assets  for  the  benefit of the 
cest11is que trust will  be  responsible  to  the creditors,  not only to  the  
extent  of  the  trust  assets  but  also  with  the  whole  of  his own 
 
 
 
 
 
09)     
 
 
 
''"  Loring,  Trustees   Handbook,   pp.   25­29;   Ames,   Cases,   2d   E<l.,   pp.   278­281; Ken· 
neson, Cases, pp. 14;•152• 
... J,oring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 29­31; Dunlevie v. Spangenberg (1910) 121 
N. Y. S. 299, 66 Misc. 354. 
"­11 Taylor v. Davis (1884) 110 U. S. 330, 335. 
"'" Johnson  v.  Leman   (1890)   131  Ill.  609,  19   Am.  St.   R.  63,   note  67;  Connally v. 
Lyons  (1891)  82 Tex. 664,  27  Am.  St.  R.  935°;  McIntyre v. Williamson  (1900)  72  Vt. 183, 
47 Atl. 786, 82 Am. St. R, 929. 
241 Roger Williams Natl. Bank v. Groton M{g. Co. (1889) 16 R. I. 504; Mitchell & 
Co. v.  Whitlock  (1897) 121 N. C. 166. 
"' Hill, Trustees (Ed. 1846) p. 533;  Woddrop  v. Weed  (1893.)  154  Pa.  St.  307, 35  Am. St. 
R. 8,12. But  see  Wright  v.  Railroad  Co.  (1909)  151 N. C. 529;  Curry  v.  Dorr  (1912)  210 
lass. 430, on 432. 
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property, and he may be made bankrupt and proceeded against in the 
same manner as any other trader, and it is immaterial  that  the trade is 
carried on by him in consequence of an express direction in the trust 
instrument; although the trust property will doubtless be primarily 
liable to creditors, and will be first applied  so  far  as  it will go in  
discharge  of the liabilities.·•m · 
This of course is directly contrary to the liability of corporate directors, 
and is so different that, if it could not be modified·it would 
es  deter  competent  business  men  from  accepting such trusts. Can a 
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trustee then exclude such liability by express stipulation to the con­ 
trary?  It  is  clear  he  can.   In  Shoe  and  Leather  Bank  v.  TVood,m it 
was held that there was not personal liability upon the trustees where 
they had executed a note reading "We as Trustees but not individually 
promise to pay," signed by themselves "Trustees ;" and  it is rnled, in 
the words of the syllabus in Russe'}' v. Arnold, "No action can be 
maintained against trustees,  holding· the property  of an 
unincorporated association, on a contract made  by  them  which by its 
terms is enforceable only against the property held in trust."m This has 
been more recently affirm ed.2t 5 
Upon the stationery of the Massachusetts Gas Companies, printed in 
red ink, there appears the following, "The name 'lvfassachusetts 
, Gas Companies' is the designation of the Trustees for the time 
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being under an agreement and  declaration  of  trust, dated  1902, and all 
persons dealing with the Massachusetts Gas  Companies  must look 
solely to the Trust property for the enforcement of any claim against 
the Companies, as neither the Trustees, Officers nor share­ holders 
assume any personal liability  for  obligations  entered  into on behalf 
of he Companies."uo In the Old South Building Trust 
ee 
deed it is provided that "In every written  order, contract or obliga­ 
tion which the Trustees shall give, authorize  or  enter  into, it shall 
be the duty of the Trustees to stipulate or cause to be stipulated that 
neither the Trustees nor shareholders shall be held to any personal 
liability under or by reason of such order, contract or obligation."m In 
some of the older cases the exemption of the trustee from per­ sonal 
liability was placed upon the right of subrogation of the creditor to 
the trustees right  of  indemnity,  and  to  that alone; so that if the 
trust estate was insolvent, or the trustee exceeded his 
... 123 Mass. 148 (1877). 
,,. 185 Mass. 202 (1904). 
.., King v. Stowell (1912) 211 Mass. 246, 251. 
"' Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 320. 
"'' Conyngton, Corporate Organization, pp. 548, 556. 
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her  
y authority  the  trustee  was still personally liable. Perhaps he still is 
in the latter case, but not in th'e former.20 
 
 
 
 
 
ion  But how about the liability of the beneficiaries? This depends 
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er s hi p. 
apparently upon whether they are really and truly, and individually, 
beneficiaries only, of an existing trust, or whether they are assoc­ ciated 
together in such a way as in fact to be partners engaged in business for 
profit, the trustees being not really the owners of the property, but in 
substance and truth the agents of the associated beneficiaries. There has 
been much consideration given to these matters in Iassachusetts. 
In Hoadley v. Commrs, 2¼ 9 the question was whether transferable 
shares in a trust were taxable as corporate shares would be, i. e., at  the 
domicile of the owner, or where the trust property was located. I-1eld, 
the latter, since they were shares in a partnership. Here the 
 
 
 
 
iat i on parties had "associated themselves to hold property and carry on 
ld business,''  "as   the  McKay  Sewing  Machine  Association,"   but no 
d.  member was to have any power to make  any  contract or  transact 
any business for the Association, which was itself to be the equit­ 
d  able owner, and "the general management of the business" was 
"vested in an executive committee * * * to be chosen by the 
ly whole body of shareholders at a meeting called by the trustee for 
that purpose." 
In Gleason v. M cKay, 2 0 the same Association  was  involved,  and  
the  question  was  whether  the  Association   should  be  taxed   upon all 
ns  its outstanding  shares, as corporations  were taxed.   It  was held  not, 
 
 
 
hi p, on the ground it was a partnership, without any corporate franchise, 
and so not subject to the tax. 
In   lVhitman  v.  Porter,n2 subscribers  associated   themselves  to­ 
gether to buy a ferry boat to be conveyed to one in trust, to be managed 
by trustees and officers elected annually by  subscribers, who were to 
have transferable shares for their interests in the "Agawam Ferry Co.;" 
the plaintiff in the case was one of the share­ holders, who had 
advanced money to pay notes given for the pur­ chase of the boat and 
to pay expenses and asked for  contribution from the others, over and 
above their subscriptions to  pay  the amount due. Held, it was 
substantially a  partnership,  and  "as between themselves they were 
ultimately liable in proportion to their interests. But as to creditors, 
each was liable for the whole." 
... Sears, Trust Estates, p. 40 et seq.; Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. 35. 
:u  105   Mass.  519 (1870). 
'"'  134  Mass.  419 (1883). 
••• 107  ?.Jass.  522 (1871). 
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In   Phillips   v.  Blatch ford/  6 2     money   was  raised   to  carry  on the 
er  business of  manufacturing  grates, by sale of  transferable certificates 
under deed of  trust providing the business  was  to be carried on  by  
a  board  of  managers  of  whom  the trustee was one, and  the others 
 
es ts  were  to  be elected  by the shareholders. Held to be a partnership. 
ed  
In Ricker v. Am. Loan & Trust  Co.,2  3  another  tax  case. it  was 
held that where those who provided the money for purchasing and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rs hi p  selling cars, to be paid for in ten payments with six per cent interest, 
were declared to be an Association  with  the  interests  represented  by 
transferable shares, the business to be managed by a boar<l of 
managers named, subject to removal by the shareholders and others 
cri bers , 
to be elected by them, the title of the property being taken in in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rati on trust by an incorporated trust company, a partnership was created, 
subject to taxation as other partnerships. 
s So too,  in William  v.  Boston,25   where  a  trust  was  organized  to 
• 
purchase the site of the Museum of Fine Arts, to be held by trustees, 
who should issue transferable  shares  to  the subscribers,  in  whom in 
meeting assembled, was vested the power to instruct the trustees  or 
remove them, and to alter or amend  the declaration  of  trust, and to  
direct  the  tmstees  to  sell  the  property,  and  although  the  deed 
s, specifically stated that neither  the shareholders  nor the trustees were 
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i ng 
to be personally liable for any obligations of the Trust, yet it was stated 
that  a  partnership  for  taxation  purposes  was  created.  In  the later 
case of Williams v. Milton (infra) it was said this was a mistake, it was 
a trust and not a partnership. 
On the other hand in Mayo v.  .Moritz,  255  an inventor  transferred his 
invention to trustees, who were to issue to him one­ha!f of a specified 
amount of scrip or  trans£erable shares,  the other  half  to  be issued to 
subscribers who should furnish the trustees with money for carrying on 
the business. The  Trustees  were to hold,  manage  and dispose of the 
invention, as they thought best, and vacancies among trustees were to 
be filled by the remaining trustees, held this did not constitute a 
partnership. 
The  same  view  is  taken  in  the still  more  recent  case of  TVilliams 
v. M ilton. 230 This is also  a  taxation  case.  The  l\Iassachusetts statute 
provides that personal  property  held  in trust, shall  be taxed to the 
trustee where the beneficiary resides; and partners shall be jointly  
taxed  in  the  firm  name,  where  the  business  is  done;   the 
 
 
,..  137  Mass.  510 (1864). 
"°" 140     Mass. 346 (1885). 
"" 08 Mass. 497 (1911), 
""151  Mass. 481 (1890). 
.,..2,5 Mass. 1 (1913). 
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business was done in Boston which sought to tax the Trust as a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ents  partnership doing business there. 
The trust deed creating this Boston Personal Property Trust, 
"expressly declared that a trust, and not a partnership is hereby 
 
 
 
tion, created; that neither the Trustees nor the cestuis que trustent shall 
d, ever  be  personally  liable  hereunder  as  partners  or  otherwise,   but 
ty  
that  for all debts  the Trustees shall be liable as such  to  the extent 
n;  of   the  Trust Fund  only. In  all  contracts  or  ins'truments creating 
liability  it shall  be expressly  stipulated  that  the cestuis que trustent 
shall not be liable." 
''The Trustees shall have as full power and discretion, as if abso­ lute 
owners, to invest and reinvest the Trust Fund, in personal property," to 
borrow money to extent of 25 per cent of property and 
t ual  
pledge as collateral security any personal property belonging to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fer abl e Trust Fund; to declare dividends in their discretion; to render an 
e annual  account;  to  resign,­vacancies  to  be  filled   by remaining 
i tmstees; to issue transferable certificates; to alter, add to or termin­ 
ate  the  trust  with  the  consent  of   three­fourths   in  interest  of  the 
ip 
cestuis que trustent. 
The court by LORING, ]., said: "Where persons associate  them­ selves 
together to carry on business for their mutual profit, they are none the 
less partners because ( 1) their  shares  in  the  partnership are  
represented  by certificates  which are  transferable  and transmis­ 
r sible,  and  because  (2)   as  a  matter  of  convenience  (if   not  of neces­ 
nt  
sity in case of transferable and transmissible certificates)  the legal title 
to the partnership property is taken in the name of  a  third person. The 
person in  whose name the partnership  property  stands in such a case 
is perhaps in a sense a trustee. But speaking with accuracy  he is an  
agent  who  for  the  principal's  convenience holds 
n the legal title to the principal's property. 
After  reviewing  the  Massachusetts  cases  above  referred  to,  the 
e 
court points out  that  the difference  between  the  partnership  cases, ( 
the Hoadley, Whitman, Gleason, Phi/lips, Ricker and Williams cases), 
on one hand and Mayo v. ,l,forit::: ( the patent case) on the other, lies in 
the fact that in the former cases the certificate  holders are associated 
together by the terms of the "trust" and are the principals whose 
instructions are to be obeyed by  their  agent  who for their convenience 
holds the legal title to their property. The property  is their  property.    
They  are  the  masters.   While  in Mayo 
v. M orit::: on the other hand there is no association between the cer­ 
tificate holders. The property is the property of the trustee5 and the trustees  
are   the  masters.     All  that   the  certificate   holders   in Mavo 
v.  M orit:;  ha<l,  was  a  right   to  have  the  property  managed   by the 
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s 
 
 
 
 
 
managers  ( the defendants,  appellant)  was not  that of  principal and 
d 
agent   ( though  doubtless   fiduciary)   but  that  the  managers them­ 
n selves became the principals in any contract which they might make." 
There are many other cases to like effect. It seems therefore that 
the usual  personal  liability  of  the trustees can  be excluded  by   ex­ 
al press   provision   brought   home  to  every  one  dealt   with;  the cestuis 
 
 
ant  q1te trust, are not partners if the ownership and control of the fund 
are left with the trustees; and  by  express  provision brought  home  to 
a dealer the Trust Fund alone can be made liable for the obliga­ tions 
of the trust. 
I have referred to the provisions relating to capital stock of a 
corporation, and pointed out some of the discordant theories in 
reference  thereto .    It   has  been,  in  the  main,  a  struggle between 
ly 
persons  on  the one  hand  who have  wished  to capitalize  visionary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pl is h prospective profits before their dreams were in fact realized, and if 
disaster came, to get out from under, with some one else in posses­ 
sion of the hot air bag,262 and the State's effort on the other hand to 
 
 
 
nts  make the actual capital, in the beginning come up to the manifesto, 
e or supplement  this by other liabilities  that frequently  work unneces­ 
sary hardship upon  honest  business. 2  3 It certainly cannot be said 
that  the schemes  so  far  devised  have been satisfactory. Upon the 
n one hand  they  have been insufficient  to accomplish  their  real purpose; 
and upon the other, have been too inflexible and inelastic to en­ 
courage­ honorable  and legitimate enterprise. The  careful investor 
e in shares has difficulty  to ascertain  from statements  of  capital stock 
ai n  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i nal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
much that aids him  in getting at  real values,  while the careless  one is 
almost certain to be misled. The creditor  also  is  in  much  the same 
predicament. The really  careful  investor  or  creditor,  relies not upon 
the capital stock statements but upon the actual  property and course of  
business of  the  particular  in stitu tion. 264  The Trust for  the most  part  
proceeds  upon  a  like  theory.  If  one deals  with a Trust in reference 
to the Trust, it is made his duty in the absence of express provisions 
otherwise, and if he has notice  that he must look to the Trttst property 
alone for security, to ascertain just what that property is, without regard 
to any amount of  nominal  shares  that may be issued against it.265 In 
other words the shares, few or many, have nothing particularly to do 
with the property, but are only the 
 
 
262 See dissenting  opinion  of  Chief  Justice  Fuller  in  Handley  v.  Stutz  (1891)  139 
U.S. 417,:: Wilgt,s, Cases, 1923, 1932• 
... Machen, A. W., "Do Corporation laws allow sufficient freedom to commercial 
enterprise?" Maryland Bar Ass'n Report, 1909, pp. 78­98. 
:et See Cook, Corporations, 7th Ed. §§ 46­47 . 
... Kisch v. Tozier (1894) 143 N. Y. 390, 42 Am. St. R. 729, note 733. 
ac t or y . 
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method of indicating aliquot  parts of  the fund  for  the convenience of 
the owners. The investor and  the creditor  both are  expected  to  act as 
business men do, and are required to do, when they are deal­  ing with 
individuals, that is, rely upon their own investigation, knowledge and 
judgment. 
 
 
gniz ed Different people will take different views as to the best policy, 
in this regarct. 00 Recently New York has provided for the issue of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
....., 
c .... 
..­..r 
corporate shares without par value, and has recognized the duty of 
investor and creditor alike  to rely  upon  his own judgment, instead 
of   upon  the  uncertain  meaning  of   a   fixed capital  stock.267 The 
efficiency and validity of blue sky laws are yet "in nubibus," and 
make  ccrporate  capitalization  still  more  intricate,­and  cloudy.268 
While the right of inspecting corporate books by shareholders 1s now 
generally recognized, without any actual controversy being in­ 
volved. such right, in the case of Trusts, can be fully recognized or 
regulated by the trust deed provisions, as the stautory or common 
law rules permit in the case of corporations. 
In an article in the Atlantic Jlfontlzl:,', a short time ago, Mr. rs F.  L. mentioned various disadvantages of corporations: 
STETSON, 
There are, said he ( 1) Taxation,­organization tax, franchist? or 
continuing tax, property tax, transfer tax, foreign state tax, and Federal 
tax, nearly all of which are now imposed upon corporations, and· in 
addition thereto the shares of shareholders are frequently taxecl to the 
owner, i'f not in the creating  state,  certainly  to him when  he lives in 
another  state.270      So, too,  the franchise  tax  may be 
imposed at home, and another privilege tax in each of the  states 
where  the  corporation   does  business,  and  these  may  be  and  fre­ 
 
 
 
 
ti on, quently are higher than domestic corporations in the same business 
pay, for a corporation does business, other than interstate  com­ 
merce,  in  a  foreign   state. by  sufferance,  comity  as   it   is called,­ 
rather  than  by  rightm. Property  of  course  is  taxed  wherever  it  is, 
, .. See Burton, T.  E.,  Corporations  and  the  State  (1911);  Stock  \Vatcring,  \V.  Z. Ripley,  
06   Pol.  Sci.  Q.  98­121   (1911);  Capital  of  Corporations,  G.  W.   Wickercham, 22 
.  Harv. Law Rev. 319­338 (1909); Overcapitalization, 38 Natl. Corp. Rep. 59 (1909); Stockwatering,  
i2  Bench  and   Bar,  43   (1908);   Williams  v.  McClavc   (1914)   148   N.  Y. S. !J.1­ 
""" Shares \Vithout Nominal or Par Value, Victor Morawctz, 26 Harv. Law Rev. 
729  (1913). ' 
""'Blue Sky Laws,  F.  A. Updike,  7  Am.  Pol.  Sci.  Rev.  230­237  (1913);  Alabama & 
N. 0. 'fransp. Co. ct al. v. Doyle (1914) 210 Fed. 173. 
"""no· Atl. Monthly, p. 27 ct seq. (1912), July), 
r.o 2 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1370­1391; Farrington v. Tennessee (1877) 95 U. S. 679, 2 
\Vilgus, Cases, 1370. 
271 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pct. (38 U. S.) 519, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 148o; Manchester 
Fire Ins.  Co.  v.  Herriott  (1899)  91  Fed.  7rr,  a  Wilgus,  Cases,  1498,  note 1502. 
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but here the fiction that personal property follows the  owner,  is often 
applied much more rigorously to corporations than to indi­ viduals. 
Shares are also subject to an inheritance tax, in the state where the 
deceased lived, in the state where the corporation is in­ corporated, and 
according to some decisions also where  the shares are to be 
transferred. The  transfer  tax  can  be  imposed  wherever the transfer 
is to be made. 272 The  Federal  tax  is  now  an  income tax, and  of  
course would apply  to the income of  a Trust  as well as 
e a corporation.   The  Supreme  Court  however  held  that  the income 
tax of 1909, applied only to such associations "as are  organized under 
some statute, or derive from that source some quality  or  benefit  not  
existing  at  the common  law," and  Trusts  were  not so 
ns  organized and have no such quality. 273 In Massachusetts  after much 
l 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
m ati on,  
variety of opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court has finally ruled that 
these institutions can be subjected to an excise tax under their 
al  constitution,  similar  to  corpo rations.2a         Trust  property  is  usually 
taxed only to the trustee, who may indemnify himself out  of  the trust 
estate. 
s 
:Mr. STETSON points out also (2) that corporations are  not protect­ 
ed under the 4th and 5th amendments as natural persons are, with 
 
 
 
 
ec t ed special reference to divulging incriminating information, discrimina­ 
tion against them, as to terms of doing business, and  enforcing claims. 
So also under the reserved power to repeal or amend cor­ porate 
charters, many limitations and restrictions upon a corpora­ tion's power 
to contract can be and are imposed that would not be valid if imposed 
upon citizens of the United States.m So a foreign corporation as a 
creditor, unless it has entered a state and complied with its laws in 
reference to doing business in the state, is not  a person within· the 
jurisdiction, so as to be protected under the 
r 
,,,. Morrison   v.   Manchester   (1879)   58  N.  H.   538;   Fowler  v.  Campbell   100  Mich. 
398;  City of  Detroit  v. Lewis,  109  Mich.  155,  32  L.  R. A.  439;  Mills v.  Thornton,  26 
111.  300,  79   Am.  Dec.  377;  Matzenbaugh   v.  People,  194  111.  108,  88  Am.  St.   R.  134; 
Latrobe  v.  Mayor,  19  Md. 13;   Corry  v.  Baltimore,  96  Md.  310,  196  U.  S.  466,  25  S. C. 
. 297;  Tappan  v.   Merchants'   Bank,  19  Wall   (U.   S.)   490;   Merriman's   Estate,  147 Mich. 
630;   Estate  of   Palmer,  183  N.  Y.  238;  In  re  Ames   Estate   (1913)   141   N'.  Y.   S.  793; 
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168; Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220. 
271 Eliot v. Freeman (1911) 220 U. S. 178. 
27•    In   re  Opinion  of  Justites   (1908)   195  Mass.  607,  84   N.  E.  490;   In   re  Opinion   of 
Justices (1911) 208 Mass. 616, 94 N. E. 1043; Compare S. S. White Dental Mfg.  Co.  v. Commw.  
(1912)   212  Mass.  35,  98  N.  E.  1056  (Corp.);  Keystone  \Vatch  Co.  v. Commw. 
(1912)  212  Mass.  50,  98  N.  E.  1063  (Corp.);  Farr  Alpaca  Co.  v.  Commw.  (1912) 212 
Mass.  156,  98  N.  E.  1078  (Corp.);  Baltic  Min.  Co.  v.  Commw.  (1913)   231   U.  S.  68, 
34 S. C. 15. 
State v. Nashville  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1911)  124 Tenn.  1,  135 S.  W.  773,  Ann.  Cas.  1912 
D.  805;  Hale  v.  Henkel  (1906)  201  U.S.  43; Wilson  v.  U.S.  (1911)  221  U.S. 361; 
McGuire v. Railway Co. (1906) 131 Ia. 340. 
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clause that says "no state shall deny to any person within its juris­ 
diction the equal protection of the laws." 276 In almost all these 
particulars, trustees being citizens  of  the United  States and entitled to 
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, would 
be protected more fully than a corporation.m So too many states 
attempt to exclude corporations doing business in the  state from suing 
in the Federal courts, and while they cannot actually exclude them from 
the Federal Courts, they may ou& the offending 
g corporation from the state.278 
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:.Mr. STETSON also points out (3) the very great and unjust toll that is 
paid by corporations in litigation because of prejudice  against them, 
exhibited by juries and legislators. In some degree at least this would 
be less pronounced in the case of a Trust, where responsible local 
citizens of standing were the trustees. 
Upon the public side it was noted in the beginning that one of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ati ons , crying weaknesses of corporations was the impersonal character, and 
the lack of individual personal responsibility, especially toward the 
public, that characterized it, and  its  actions.  It  might  seem  that here 
the Trust would be superior; and it  is more  than  probable that so far 
as the relation of the Trustee toward the beneficiaries, is concerned, 
there is under the rules ·of courts of Equity, a much more positive and 
direct feeling of personal responsibility. 
, Toward  the public, however, this may be doubted,  for  we have the 
experience that all of our great industrial combinations, good  and bad, 
have almost without exception originated  as  Trusts,  under Trust deeds 
such as we have been describing ;279 and from this form, held by the 
New York Court of  Appeals, in the Sugar T rust280  case  to be illegal  
as a  partnership  contrary  to the  right  of  a corporation 
s  
to be a member of such, and by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 
Standard Oil Case to be an institution in unlawful  restraint  of trade,281    
those  v­:ho  then  saw  the handwriting  on  the  wall  fled in 
7, hope to find  legal shelter  in  the corporate  form,  only  to find   their 
"'' Blake  v. McClung  (1900)  176 U. S.  S9,  a  Wilgus,  Cases,  2045:  (1898)  172   U. S. 
239, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2036. 
m Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. (1886) 27 Fed. 146; Roby 
v. Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 20 N. E. 1093: Scars, Trust Estates etc., 194. 
211 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876) 94 U. S. S3S, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1491: 
Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (1914) ­ U. S. ­, 34 S. C. 333. 
211 See  I  Wilgus,  Cases,  pp.  957,984.  Sec  cases  in  212  lllass.,  and   231   U.  S.  in  
note 274 above 
"'"People '"· North River Sugar Ref. Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 582, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 
100, note 109. 
"'State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 0. S. 137, 34 Am. St. R. 541. 
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ted  hope in vain.282 Neither trust nor corporate form where restraint 
on of trade is the end of the organization, can stand the searching 
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ni es . 
power of the government to destroy either  under  the common  law or 
under the anti­trust acts.283 
·Massachusetts has through Commissioners made investigations of 
these Express Trusts, and after two reports, enacted legislation pro­ 
viding for the filing with the Railroad Commission of all deeds of trust 
for such Associations, and in the case of Trusts for owning 
n shares in railway, street  railway and electric  railway  companies,  or 
which  are  managed  by  the  same parties, making annual  reports to, 
 
 
i n, and making them subject to examination by, the Railroad Commis­ 
 
ac t or y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ti on 
sion. The same power is given also to the Gas Commission in reference 
to gas, electric light, and power companies. 
If the foregoing review is accurate, it would seem that, largely 
because of the variety, uncertainty, and confusion arising from con­ 
flicting legislative provisions, the Tmst form of organization, at 
f least  upon  the  private side,  is more simple,  certain,  consistent and 
yet  flexible,  and  perhaps  with   even   more  satisfactory safeguard. 
ilit y  
available both to the investor and the creditor, than is the corpora­ tion. 
Upon the public side, however, so far as control is concerned, the 
State can reach an offending corporation more directly and posi­ tively, 
notwithstanding the Trust form of  organization  was abandoned for the 
corporate form, with the belief that in that way 
t 
anti­trust laws could be evaded. 
So far as any feeling of direct personal responsibility toward the 
public as a whole rs c;oncerned, there does not seem to be much 
difference. The psychology of  the group mind seems to be inherently 
different from that of a single individual. It  will seek and accomp­ lish 
ends from which individuals will shrink.   As the non­explosives, 
. 
glycerine,  nitric and sulphuric acids and saw­dust  mixed,  make   the 
explosive dynamite, so does the combination of the intelligent, the 
stupid, the selfish and unselfish, the honest and the dishonest, into  one 
group, give a resultant that when quiescent usually does much better 
than the worst, yet from hidden powers often does  much  worse than 
the worst. 286      Undoubtedly much could  be done to make 
m    Distilling  &  Cattle  Feeding  Co.  v•. People   (1895)   156  Ill.  448,  1  Wilgus,  Cases, 
978. 
,,.. Northern Securities Co. v. U. 5. (1903) 193 U. 5. 200; Standard Oil Co. v. 
U.  S.   (1910)   221  U.  S.  1;   L'.  S.  v.  Am. Tobacco  Co.  (1910)   221  U.  S.  106• 
.,.. Sec chapters 454, 509, and 596 of Public Acts of 1913. 
211 Distilling and Cattle  Feeding  Co. v.  People  (1895) 156 Ill. 448, 47 Am. St. R. 
1 \Vilgus, Cases, 978. 
""' LeBon, The Crowd, pp. 2­44. 
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our corporation laws, more simple, certain and flexible; and  a properly 
worked out Federal incorporation law would help corpora­ tions with 
extensive business in many respects, and furnish a model 
, for state legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
er ly  
\Vhen laws are uncertain, or unduly hamper legitimate enterprise, 
s, bright  minds  will  invent  methods  to  accomplish  unexpected ends. 
In  the early  years of  our  history,  there  was great  prejudice against 
n the incorporation  of  banks, and there were either no laws permi•tting 
k it or if  there were any, they were such as were difficult to comply 
with. The brilliant services of Alexander Hamilton, and of Aaron  
Burr  were called  in  requisition  to devise plans for  the institution of 
pl y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pl us  
banks in New York City. Hamilton drew up a masterly paper which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it uti ons  with a­ few words changed­directors to trustees, shareholders to 
beneficiaries, and a few others, would still be a model form for a 
ss  Trust for business purposes, such as we have been considering, an<l 
which was the constitution of the Merchants Bank for 20 years, until the 
legislature forbade banking  in  any  but  the  corporation  form. On the 
other hand Aaron Burr engineered a bill through the  New York 
legislature to incorporate a company to supply the city of Kew York 
with water, and with authority to use its surplus capital "in 
me any  way  not  inconsistent   with  the  laws  and  constitutions  of  the 
United States and New York."  Under  ithis charter,  so it is stated, 
the Manhattan Bank has been carrying on business for 115 years.288 
These perhaps are typical illustrations as to what lawyers are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ited  calied upon to' do, and the methods sometimes resorted to. The one 
statesman­like,  constructive,  and   within the  law. The other un­ 
statesman­like, destructive,  and  if  within  the law  at  all, only  so by 
m taking advantage of  its uncertainty,  to thwart  the expressed  will  of 
the people. 
d 
Perhaps these things can never be wholly overcome until men are 
made over. All production is the result of the combination of forces 
within man, with forces and •things outside him, of persons and 
property. From the beginning of  time  some  men  in  whom  the sense 
of brotherhood was latent or unborn,  have  always  classed other men 
as external things to be used or exploited as  other  property, and have 
considered it proper to  take  all  that  their strength, their wit or their 
cunning enabled  them  to  take;  others have believed that they should 
take  no  more  from  the  common fund than thev had contributed to it; 
still others that ­they should contribute to it all their ability and their 
skill would enable them to 
""'Hamilton's \Vorks, vol. 7, pp. 838­844; Sears, Tntat Estates, etc., p. 341. 
""Century Magazine, May, 1899; Parton'• Life of Burr, p. 238. 
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m 
do, and take from it only what they needed. There is no doubt but 
that the trend of the ages has been practically from the first of these 
toward the second, and perhaps in the more recent years of ­the 
Christian era, there has been a trend ideally at least, if not much 
practically, toward the third.  As  one  or  the  other  of  these  ends are 
dominant so will the nature and the administration of  the laws  be. And 
so will the institutions founded upon  them  be.  But none will be 
perfect until men are perfect. 
 
Uni·vcrsity of Michigan. 
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